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strategic complementarity in information acquisition: the more informed traders are,
the larger market makers’ gain from becoming informed. When quotes are observable,
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show that increasing the cost of information can decrease market liquidity and improve
price discovery.
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1 Introduction
Dealer markets are financial markets in which market makers (MMs) act as intermediaries
between sellers and buyers (collectively referred to as traders). The distribution of information
among market participants plays a central role in dealer markets, for instance regarding market
liquidity. The classic model of dealer markets (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) assumes that
traders have superior information, yet empirical evidence shows that MMs can be better
informed than traders.1 What does the structure of dealer markets imply about when we
should expect to see one situation or the other?
In a dealer market, MMs supply liquidity by quoting bid and ask prices. Traders then
submit buy and sell (market) orders.2 The literature often distinguishes between two kinds
of traders, speculators and liquidity traders: the former trade for profits, and the latter due
to liquidity shocks. A MM buys low and sells high, adjusting his bid-ask spread (henceforth
spread) to (a) the adverse selection faced and (b) the competition to offer the best quotes.
Suppose now that the cost of acquiring information about an asset’s value is the same for all
market participants, that is, for traders and MMs: who then becomes informed? To address
this question, the present paper analyses a simple two-stage game: information acquisition
takes place in the first period, and trade in the second.
We first identify a one-sided strategic complementarity in information acquisition. MMs’
gain from becoming informed is increasing in the probability that traders are informed. The
logic is simple. The more informed traders are, the worse the adverse selection facing unin-
formed MMs, who respond by increasing their spreads. This, in turn, softens price competition
for informed MMs, who can now increase their own spreads. So MMs’ incremental trading
profit from being informed increases with the probability that traders are informed. By con-
trast, as traders make less profits from trading when MMs are informed than when they are
uninformed, traders’ gain from becoming informed is always decreasing in the probability that
MMs are informed. The result of these observations is a one-sided strategic complementarity
in information acquisition.
We then address the question of who acquires information, and show that the microstruc-
ture of dealer markets pins down the pattern of information acquisition, as illustrated in Figure
1. If the cost of information and the share of speculators comprising the market are small then
1Glosten and Milgrom (1985) were primarily interested in understanding the workings of dealer markets in
the presence of insider trading. The empirical literature is discussed in Section 7.
2The bid price (respectively ask price) is the price at which MMs buy (resp. sell) and traders sell (resp.
buy) the asset. The bid-ask spread refers to the difference between the two.
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Figure 1: Who Acquires Information
MMs acquire information whereas speculators choose to remain uninformed; if they are large
the situation is reversed: speculators acquire information but MMs remain uninformed.3 In
between, MMs and speculators all become informed with positive probability.
The logic behind who acquires information is as follows. Consider first the effect of infor-
mation cost. Due to the positive fraction of liquidity traders, a MM’s gain from becoming
informed remains bounded away from zero as long as not all his competitors acquire infor-
mation with probability one. As a result, MMs’ information acquisition probability is pushed
towards one as the information cost tends to zero. An uninformed MM then expects profitable
market orders to be picked off by his competitors with probability close to 1. He therefore
faces severe adverse selection, that leads him to set large spreads. This, in turn, implies that
the probability that an informed trader finds a profitable trade and the profit that can be
made on this trade both go to zero as the cost tends to zero. Traders’ gain from acquiring
information is therefore second order in the cost of information. In consequence, at small
information costs, traders best respond by remaining uninformed.
Consider next larger information costs; to illustrate the main mechanism in this case,
suppose that none of the market participants acquire information. As MMs then face no
adverse selection, the spreads equal zero. The price at which MMs buy the asset thus equals
the price at which traders buy the asset. Similarly, the price at which MMs sell the asset equals
3The latter case therefore microfounds Glosten-Milgrom types of markets.
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the price at which traders sell the asset. So conditional on order execution, an informed trader
makes the same profit as an informed MM. However, MMs face execution risk, which traders
do not.4 So traders’ expected profit when informed is larger than MMs’. We show this way
that a cost range exists in which MMs are uninformed and speculators acquire information.
The effect of market composition on information acquisition is explained as follows. A
speculator abstains from trading when she is uninformed, so MMs only recoup the cost of
information from executing the orders of liquidity traders. MMs therefore stop acquiring
information when the fraction of speculators in the market becomes sufficiently large. The
information acquired by MMs in turn determines speculators’ incentives to become informed:
speculators remain uninformed when the fraction of liquidity traders is large (in which case
most MMs are informed), whereas speculators acquire information when liquidity traders are
rare (in which case most MMs are uninformed).
Our analysis shows that, in sharp contrast to models in which MMs are uninformed,
increasing the cost of information can decrease market liquidity and improve price discovery.5
We furthermore show that an increase in the fraction of speculators can increase market
liquidity and reduce price discovery.
We divide for expository purposes the analysis in two parts. We first study a baseline
model in which traders submit market orders without having observed MMs’ quotes.6 This
assumption enables us to illustrate the underlying economic principles at work in the simplest
possible setting. We then let the traders observe MMs’ quotes before placing their market
orders. All main results continue to hold, but making the quotes observable yields additional
insights. In particular, the mechanism at play in the one-sided strategic complementarity in
information acquisition previously highlighted induces in this case a strategic complementarity
in information acquisition amongst MMs. Information acquired by one MM now leaks through
to the traders via the quotes of that MM, so the more information acquired by any MM
the more informed traders are. The rest of the mechanism is as described earlier: more
informed trading worsens adverse selection for uninformed MMs which, in turn, softens price
competition for informed MMs.
4A market order is executed with probability 1 at the quoted price. By contrast, a quote may not be
executed. A quote in our setting corresponds to a limit order, and execution risk plays a key role in limit
order markets, where it is a key determinant of a trader’s choice between market and limit orders (see, e.g.
Kaniel and Liu (2006)).
5We use the expected spread to measure (inverse) market liquidity, and the expected squared price error
to measure (inverse) price discovery.
6One interpretation is that quotes are hidden limit orders, as in e.g. Boulatov and George (2013).
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The related literature is discussed in the next paragraphs. Section 2 presents the baseline
model, which we analyze in Sections 3 to 5. Section 3 takes the probabilities with which
different market participants acquire information as given, and examines the resulting trading
game. Section 4 endogenizes information acquisition. Section 5 investigates market liquidity
and price discovery. Section 6 extends the baseline model by allowing traders to observe MMs’
quotes before market orders are submitted. Section 7 discusses the model and results, and
relates our findings to the empirical literature, as well as to recent developments in financial
markets.
Related literature. The literature on information acquisition in financial markets stretches
back at least to Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Verrecchia (1982). Glosten and Milgrom
(1985) introduced the model of dealer markets on which we build. Endogenizing traders’ infor-
mation acquisition is relatively straightforward in this model, if one maintains the assumption
that MMs are uninformed (see, e.g., Foucault, Pagano and Röell (2013)). By contrast, the
problem of information acquisition by MMs is non-trivial. If one fixes traders’ information,
the problem is formally equivalent to the information acquisition problem in a standard (first-
price sealed-bid common-value) auction setting, analyzed in e.g. Milgrom (1981), Lee (1984),
Persico (2000), or Atakan and Ekmekci (2019). The present paper is the first to analyze
information acquisition simultaneously occurring on both sides of a dealer market, and to
investigate how information acquired by one side of the market affects incentives to acquire
information on the other side.
Within the literature on dealer markets, Chamley (2007) allows traders to acquire costly
information; Leach and Madhavan (1993), Bloomfield and O’Hara (2000), and de Frutos and
Manzano (2005) take on the other hand traders’ information as given, and explore MMs’
incentives to manipulate prices in order to learn from the order flow. Our paper is also
connected to a broader literature on two-sided information acquisition. Dang (2008) analyzes
a bargaining game in which the buyer can acquire information before offering a price; the
seller observes the offer and can acquire information before deciding whether or not to sell.
Unlike our setting, the price-setter is monopolistic and information may be acquired after
the price is observed. Tirole (2009, 2015) and Bolton and Faure-Grimaud (2010) examine
contracting environments in which both parties can acquire information. However, the setting
they explore is quite different from ours and offers the players a great deal of commitment
power, which is typically lacking in asset markets. We discuss in Section 7 how our paper
relates to the literature on limit-order markets, in which market participants choose between
4
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Liquidity shock with








demanding and supplying liquidity.
2 Baseline Model
We consider the market for a risky asset with random value V where P(V = 1) = P(V = 0) =
1
2
. The realization of V is denoted v. There are two market makers (MMs, he), indexed by
n = 1, 2, and one trader (she). We denote market maker n by MMn. At t = 1, all market
participants privately decide whether to observe v for a cost c > 0. Trade takes place at t = 2:
the trader decides whether to submit a market order for one unit of the asset, and MMs
simultaneously choose bid and ask prices. In the baseline model, the trader does not observe
the prices before placing her market order; we relax this assumption in Section 6. There is
price priority on the market, meaning that market orders are executed at the best possible
price. The tie-breaking rule is specified as part of the equilibrium. The ask (respectively bid)
price of MMn is denoted an (resp. bn). Hence, the trader’s profit from a buy order (resp. sell
order) is v − â (resp. b̂ − v), where â := minn an and b̂ := maxn bn; the profit of the MM
executing the order is the opposite. For expository simplicity, we assume that MMs choose
ask and bid prices in [0, 1].
We say that the trader is a speculator if her objective is to maximize her expected profit.
The trader is a speculator with probability π, whereas with probability 1 − π the trader is
privately hit by a liquidity shock before her decision at t = 1: she then buys and sells the
asset with equal probability independently of all other random variables of the model. In this
case we say that the trader is a liquidity trader. To make the analysis interesting we assume
π ∈ (0, 1). Figure 2 summarizes the timing of the model.
Equilibrium. Let MMnU refer to MMn when he has not acquired information, and MMnH
(respectively MMnL) refer to MMn when he has acquired information and observed v = 1
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(resp. v = 0). A strategy of MMn comprises a probability pn of acquiring information at t = 1,
and cumulative distribution functions σn, σn and σn specifying respectively the distribution
of the bid price bn of MMnU, MMnL and MMnH. As the bid and ask sides of the market
are symmetric we assume, without loss of generality, that, conditional on MMnU, 1 − an is
distributed like bn. Similarly, we assume that 1 − an conditional on MMnL (resp. MMnH)
is distributed like bn conditional on MMnH (resp. MMnL). We will often use the index m in
conjunction with n, such that n and m represent the two MMs. A strategy of the speculator
comprises a probability q of acquiring information at t = 1, as well as a market order as a
function of her information at t = 2. The equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
with the tie-breaking rule specified as part of the equilibrium.7
The next definition will prove useful in the following sections. Roughly, a Wilson-Engelbrecht-
Milgrom-Weber-Lee (henceforth WELM) equilibrium is an equilibrium in which both MMs
play the same strategy, and MMnL bids below MMnU who himself bids below MMnH.8
Definition 1. An equilibrium is a WELM equilibrium if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) both MMs acquire information with probability p;
(ii) MMs’ bidding strategies are identical: σ1 = σ2 = σ, σ1 = σ2 = σ and σ1 = σ2 = σ;
(iii) MMnL bids zero with probability 1: σ(0) = 1;
(iv) either p ∈ {0, 1} or σ and σ are atomless, with supp (σ) = [0, l] and supp (σ) = [l, u].
We show below in Theorem 2 that any equilibrium of the baseline model is a WELM equilib-
rium. In Section 6 we discuss how WELM selects equilibria when quotes are observable.
3 A One-Sided Strategic Complementarity
In this section we fix the probabilities p1, p2 and q with which MM1, MM2 and the speculator
are informed and study the trading game that results. An equilibrium of this game will
be referred to as a trading equilibrium. The trading game is formally equivalent in the
case q = 0 to a first-price sealed-bid common-value auction with (possibly) asymmetrically
informed bidders.9 In contrast to that literature however, our objective is to study and
7A tie-breaking rule specifies the probabilities, in case of ties, with which market orders are executed by
MM1, as a function of the MMs’ quotes.
8After Wilson (1967), Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom and Weber (1983), and Lee (1984).
9Such auctions have been analyzed, as already mentioned, by Wilson (1967), Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al.
(1983), and Lee (1984).
6
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2875763
compare profits on the two sides of a dealer market, and to analyze the effect of information
acquired by one side of the market on incentives to acquire information on the other side. All
proofs of this section are in Appendix A.
As the equilibrium structure of the trading game closely resembles that found in the
aforementioned literature, the formal definitions and detailed analysis are relegated to Online
Appendix C. We briefly summarize below the main ideas and then move on to analyzing how
the information probabilities p1, p2 and q affect profits in the trading game.
In the trading game, the MMs and the trader simultaneously post, respectively, quotes
and a market order. Except in knife-edge cases, in any trading equilibrium the speculator
sells (respectively buys) with probability 1 when she is informed and observed v = 0 (resp.
v = 1), and abstains when she is uninformed. For the informed speculator the intuition is
straightforward, since both bid and ask prices are in the unit interval. Since MMs set quotes
so as to not lose money on average, the uninformed speculator cannot make positive expected
profit from trading, and optimally abstains. The support of the equilibrium bid distributions
of different types of a given MM never strictly overlap: MMnL bids below MMnU, who himself
bids below MMnH.10 To see why, fix the bid of MMnL at zero and suppose for the sake of
argument that we can find 0 < b′ < b′′ such that MMnU and MMnH both bid at b′ and at
b′′ with positive probability. In this case MMnH must be indifferent between the two. Thus,
conditional on V = 1, MMnU is also indifferent between b′ and b′′. However, conditional on
V = 0, MMnU strictly prefers b′ to b′′, since bidding b′ gives a smaller winning probability,
and a smaller loss in case of winning. Hence, MMnU strictly prefers b′ over b′′, contradicting
the hypothesis that MMnU chooses both with positive probability.
We now analyze profits. We define an informed market participant’s expected trading
profit as his/her expected profit in the trading game when he/she is informed, and similarly
for an uninformed market participant.11 Trading profits are gross profits, that is, profits
obtained before subtracting the cost of information. We show the following result.
Lemma 1. For all p1, p2 and q, a trading equilibrium exists. Any given market participant’s
expected trading profit when informed is independent of the trading equilibrium considered.
Similarly, any given market participant’s expected trading profit when uninformed is indepen-
dent of the trading equilibrium considered.
10MMnL always bids zero. MMnU never bids above 12 . Both MMnU and MMnH use mixed bidding
strategies unless either p1 = p2 = 0 or p1 = p2 = 1.
11For definiteness, in the case of an informed market participant the expectation is calculated before observ-
ing v. Of course, in equilibrium, the symmetry of the bid and ask sides of the market makes this distinction
irrelevant: expected profits before and after observing v are then the same thing.
7
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2875763
We now let Πn (respectively Πn) denote the equilibrium expected trading profit of MMn
when uninformed (resp. informed), and ΠS (respectively ΠS) denote the equilibrium expected
trading profit of the speculator when uninformed (resp. informed).
Lemma 2. Suppose pn > pm. Then Πm = Πn > Πn > Πm = 0.
In equilibrium, both MMs earn the same (expected) profit when informed. Intuitively,
if MMnH were to make more profit than MMmH, then MMmH could increase his profit by
bidding just above MMnH’s highest bid price. Next, if pn > pm then MMnU makes greater
profit than MMmU. The logic is straightforward: informed MMs pick a disproportionate
share of profitable market orders; since MMn is more often informed than MMm, MMmU
then faces more adverse selection than MMnU. Intuitively, an uninformed MM extracts rent
from a competitor’s belief that he is informed with high probability. For our purpose the
main implication is the following: pn > pm implies Πn − Πn < Πm − Πm, that is, MMm’s
incremental profit from being informed is greater than that of MMn. Consequently, any
equilibrium must be such that p1 = p2 (in fact, any equilibrium of the baseline model is a
WELM equilibrium; see Theorem 2). We therefore focus in the rest of the section on profiles
of information acquisition satisfying p1 = p2, and let p denote the common probability with
which MMs are informed. The next theorem is the central result of this section.
Theorem 1. There is a one-sided strategic complementarity in information acquisition.
1. The more information acquired by any market participant the smaller the speculator’s
gain from acquiring information: ΠS − ΠS is decreasing in p and q.
2. By contrast, information acquired by the speculator enhances MMs’ gain from acquiring
information: Πn − Πn is decreasing in p but increasing in q.
The logic behind the effects of p and q on the speculator’s gain from being informed is as
follows. The speculator’s only chance of making a profit is against uninformed MMs. Raising
p therefore reduces the speculator’s chances of finding a profitable trade.12 Higher q, on the
other hand, generates greater adverse selection for uninformed MMs, which in turn induces
wider spreads. Increasing q thus reduces the profit made by the speculator on each profitable
trade.
12Moreover, raising p increases adverse selection for uninformed MMs which, in turn, induces the latter to
set wider bid-ask spreads, further reducing the informed speculator’s expected trading profit.
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The effect of p on MMs’ gain from information is straightforward, as higher p means greater
competition for profitable market orders. The effect of q on MMs’ gain from information is
the more interesting effect. Increasing q worsens the adverse selection problem faced by all
uninformed MMs, which induces them to set wider spreads. This, in turn, softens price com-
petition for informed MMs, who now increase their own spreads. MMs’ incremental trading
profit from being informed therefore increases in the probability with which the speculator
acquires information.
4 Information Acquisition
In this section we analyze equilibrium information acquisition in the baseline model. We
show that the pattern of information acquisition is uniquely determined as a function of
information cost and market composition. In particular, at small information costs MMs
acquire information whereas the speculator chooses to remain uninformed. The situation is
reversed at larger costs. The next theorem is this section’s central result. All proofs of this
section are in Appendix A.
Theorem 2. There exists an equilibrium. Moreover, any equilibrium is a WELM equilib-
rium. The information acquisition probabilities, p and q, are independent of the equilibrium
considered; p is non-increasing in c and tends to 1 as c tends to 0. For c > 1/2, neither the
speculator nor the MMs acquire information, and there exist 0 < c < c < 1
2
such that:
• if c ∈ (0, c) then MMs acquire information with positive probability but the speculator
remains uninformed;
• if c ∈ (c, c) then the MMs and the speculator all acquire information with positive prob-
ability;
• if c ∈ (c, 1
2
) then the speculator acquires information with positive probability but MMs
remain uninformed.
In view of Theorem 2, the standard assumptions about informational asymmetries in dealer
markets whereby informed speculators and liquidity traders trade with uninformed MMs are
warranted for a range of high information costs (c ∈ (c, 1
2
)). Yet, strikingly, at lower costs
(c ∈ (0, c)) the market consists only of liquidity traders, informed MMs and uninformed MMs.
The equilibrium pattern of information acquisition is illustrated in Figure 3, panel A, for
9
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(a) Information Cost, c








(b) Fraction of Speculators, π
Figure 3: Equilibrium Information Acquisition
π = 3
10
.13 The information acquisition probabilities are on the vertical axis; the information
cost is on the horizontal axis. The solid curve shows the equilibrium p, and the dotted curve
the equilibrium q. We also indicate the cutoff c > 0 below which the speculator is uninformed,
and the cutoff c < 1
2
above which MMs are uninformed.
The uniqueness of p and q as well the non-increasingness of p as a function of c all fol-
low from Theorem 1. We summarize in the next paragraphs the logic behind who acquires
information. Notice that in a WELM equilibrium uninformed market participants make zero
expected profits (Πn = ΠS = 0) so gains from being informed equal expected profits when
informed.
At small information costs, MMs acquire information. As uninformed MMs never set
bid prices above 1
2
nor set ask prices below 1
2
, MMn’s gain from being informed in the trading
game is at least as large as (1−p)(1−π)
4
: there is probability (1 − p) that MMm is uninformed,
in which case the informed type of MMn ensures profit 1
2
whenever the trader is a liquidity
trader who either sells when V = 1 or buys when V = 0, which occurs with probability 1−π
2
.
Thus, in equilibrium, (1−p)(1−π)
4
≤ c, and p tends to 1 as c tends to 0.14
13The code used for calculating the equilibrium and simulating the prices in the following figures is available
on the authors’ websites.
14If (1−p)(1−π)4 > c then a MM’s gain from acquiring information is larger than the cost of information,
implying p = 1. But this is a contradiction, since c > 0.
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At small information costs, MMs crowd out the speculator. By symmetry of the bid
and ask sides of the market, the speculator’s gain from being informed in the trading game
may be written as
ΠS − ΠS = (1− p2)E[ b̂ |V = 0, either 1 or 2 MMs are uninformed]. (1)
The factor 1 − p2 represents the speculator’s chances of making a positive profit, which will
only occur if at least one MM is uninformed. The second term is the expectation of the best









Consider now the expectation of the best bid price appearing on the right-hand side of (1).
As p tends to 1, an uninformed MM is almost exclusively left with unprofitable market orders
(when p is close to 1 an uninformed MM expects profitable market orders to be picked off by
his competitor). Since p tends to 1 when c tends to 0, an uninformed MM’s bid-ask spread
therefore tends to 1 as c tends to 0, giving15
lim
c→0
E[ b̂ |V = 0, either 1 or 2 MMs are uninformed] = 0. (3)
Lastly, combining (1), (2) and (3) gives ΠS − ΠS < c for all c sufficiently small. This implies
that the speculator chooses to remain uninformed at small information costs.
At high information costs, the speculator acquires information whereas MMs
remain uninformed. Fix p = 0 and q = 1, and consider the resulting trading game. With
both MMs uninformed, Bertrand competition yields b̂ = E[V |sell] = 1−π
2
= 1 − â.16 The
informed speculator sells when V = 0 and buys when V = 1. Hence,






(1− â) = 1− π
2
. (4)
Now, if a MM were informed he would pick all profitable market orders, that is, all sell orders
of the liquidity trader when V = 1 and all buy orders of the liquidity trader when V = 0. We
15A formal proof of (3) is provided in Appendix A.
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therefore obtain












Combining (4) and (5) yields Πn − Πn < ΠS − ΠS. The latter inequality establishes that,




], the unique equilibrium information acquisition probabilities are q = 1 and
p = 0: the speculator acquires information whereas MMs remain uninformed. Intuitively,
MMs face execution risk, which the speculator does not. Hence if spreads are not too wide,
such that MMs and speculator face not too dissimilar prices, then the speculator’s gain from
becoming informed is larger than the corresponding gain of MMs.
We end this section by investigating the effect of the composition of the market (in terms
of speculation versus liquidity trading) on information acquisition.
Proposition 1. Assume c < 1
2
. There exist 0 ≤ π ≤ π < 1 such that, in any equilibrium:
• if π ∈ (0, π) then MMs acquire information with positive probability but the speculator
remains uninformed;
• if π ∈ (π, π) then the MMs and the speculator all acquire information with positive
probability;
• if π ∈ (π, 1) then the speculator acquires information with positive probability but MMs
remain uninformed.
Moreover, there exists c∗ > 0 such that π > 0 if and only if c < c∗. Lastly, the equilibrium
probability p with which a MM acquires information is non-increasing in π, and the equilibrium
probability q with which the speculator acquires information tends to 0 as π tends to 1.
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 3, panel B, for c = 0.15. The vertical axis shows
information acquisition, with π on the horizontal axis. The MMs exclusively recoup c by
executing market orders from the liquidity trader. So MMs acquire information when liquidity
trades are frequent and remain uninformed when liquidity trades are rare. The speculator,
on the other hand, exclusively recoups c by trading with uninformed MMs. Therefore, the
speculator remains uninformed when liquidity trades are frequent, in which case most MMs
are informed, and acquires information when liquidity trades are rare, in which case most
MMs are uninformed. The speculator’s information acquisition probability tends to 0 as π
tends to 1. If this were not the case then, conditional on V = 0, b̂ would have to converge to
12
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(a) Information Cost, c






(b) Fraction of Speculators, π
Figure 4: Market Liquidity
0 (in probability) since the probability of a market order coming from the speculator would
tend to 1 as π tends to 1. Similarly, conditional on V = 1, â would have to converge to 1.
However, in that case, the speculator would have no incentive at all to pay for information.
5 Market Liquidity and Price Discovery
The model’s implications for the spread (measuring “inverse” market liquidity) and squared
price error (measuring “inverse” price discovery) contrast with the predictions of models in
which MMs are uninformed. In a model where only speculators can acquire information,
increasing the cost of information would reduce informed trading and, thereby, adverse selec-
tion too. The combination of these effects would in turn decrease the spread and increase the
squared price error. By contrast, in our model increasing c can increase the expected spread
and reduce the expected squared price error (thus reducing market liquidity and improving
price discovery). We also show that increasing π can reduce the expected spread and increase
the expected squared price error (thus improving market liquidity and reducing price discov-
ery). Below we use “spread” and “squared price error” to refer to these variables’ expected
values.17 We next discuss these implications in turn.
17Specifically, throughout this section the spread refers to s := E[â − b̂]. The squared price error refers to
d := E[(r− V )2], with r denoting the realized price: r = â in case of a buy order, r = b̂ in case of a sell order,
and r = â+b̂2 if the trader abstains.
13
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(a) Information Cost, c
0 = π = π 0.5 1
(b) Fraction of Speculators, π
Figure 5: Price Discovery
Increasing the cost of information can increase the spread. The mechanism is as
follows. Suppose v = 1, to fix ideas. Each MM acquires information with probability converg-
ing to 1 as c tends to 0 (Theorem 2). Informed MMs competing to offer the best bid price
then ensure that b̂ converges (in probability) to 1 as c tends to 0. Hence, as v = 1 implies
â = 1 whenever both MMs are informed, the spread converges (in probability) to 0 as c tends
to 0. But then, starting at a very small c, increasing the cost must increase the spread. We
illustrate this effect in Figure 4, panel A, for π = 3
10
.
Increasing the cost of information can reduce the squared price error. The rea-
son is that, in an intermediate cost range, raising c induces the speculator to acquire more
information (Theorem 2; see also Figure 3, panel A). In this range, raising c in addition leads
MMs to acquire less information. However, due to the one-sided strategic complementarity
highlighted in Theorem 1, in this cost range q rises faster than p falls: so the negative impact
on the squared price error resulting from the speculator’s increased information acquisition
dominates the positive impact resulting from MMs’ reduced information acquisition. The
resulting effect is illustrated in Figure 5, panel A, for π = 7
10
.
Increasing the fraction of speculators in the market can reduce the spread. Im-
mediately below π = π, the probability q with which the speculator acquires information is
invariant in π, yet p decreases with π (see Figure 3, panel B). This in turn reduces uninformed
14
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MMs’ adverse selection problem, who therefore narrow their spreads. We illustrate this effect
in Figure 4, panel B, for c = 0.15.
Increasing the fraction of speculators in the market can increase the squared price
error. This finding is a consequence of the market collapse resulting from excessively scarce
liquidity trading: a high fraction of speculators induces very large spreads which, in turn,
dissuades speculators from acquiring information (and, therefore, trading). Increasing the
fraction of speculators can thus reduce speculators’ market participation and via this channel




In this section we extend the baseline model of Section 2 by letting the MMs’ quotes be
observable with probability z before the trader’s decision in period t = 2; the baseline model
corresponds to z = 0.18 The timing of the observable quotes model is illustrated in Figure
6. The trader is privately hit by the liquidity shock with probability 1 − π, after which all
market participants privately decide whether to observe v, for a cost c > 0. The MMs then
simultaneously choose bid and ask prices.19 The trader observes the quotes with probability
z; she then either abstains or places a market order for one unit of the asset. All proofs of
this section are in Appendix B.
Liquidity shock with







with probability z and
submits market order
Figure 6: Timing – Observable Quotes
18The cases z = 0 and z = 1 are arguably the cases with the most applied interest; for completeness and in
order to derive further comparative statics, we allow however z to take any value in [0, 1].
19We assume for tractability that the MMs set prices simultaneously, but note that in many modern markets
MMs would also be able to observe each others’ quotes.
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Relative to the baseline model, making the quotes observable adds several layers of com-
plexity:
• Each MM’s decision to acquire information now induces additional externalities on the
other MM: information which the speculator learns through the prices of one MM may
be used to make profit against the other MM. Two interesting consequences of this
feature are that:
(i) MM’s gain from acquiring information is increasing in quote observability, z;
(ii) MM’s gain from acquiring information can increase with MMs’ information, p.
• As the speculator can now learn about v without acquiring information herself, observ-
able quotes reduce the speculator’s gain from acquiring information.
• Observable quotes allow MMs to manipulate demand through prices. For instance,
MMnU could masquerade as MMnH and reduce adverse selection by “jamming” the
signal of MMmL.
To make progress and keep the analysis tractable we restrict attention throughout this
section to WELM equilibria.20 While multiple WELM equilibria exist, we show in Online
Appendix D that all WELM equilibria share important common properties. First, as MMs
(optimally) reveal their information to the trader, the speculator who does not acquire in-
formation learns v with probability z[1 − (1 − p)2
]
, that is, as long as the speculator gets to
observe the quotes and at least one MM is informed. The speculator trades if she acquires in-
formation directly, or if she learns v indirectly through a MM’s quotes; she abstains otherwise.
Second, given p and q, a market participant’s expected trading profit when he/she acquires
information is the same in all WELM trading equilibria.21 Similarly, his/her expected trading
profit when he/she does not acquire information is the same in all WELM trading equilibria.
We thus extend previous notation and let Πn (respectively Πn) denote MMn’s equilibrium
expected trading profit when he does not acquire information (resp. when he does acquire
20Theorem 2 ruled out non-WELM equilibria in the case z = 0. In WELM equilibria different MM types
bid in non-overlapping intervals; so when quotes are observable, an informed MM (optimally) reveals his
information to the trader. Whether non-WELM equilibria exist for z > 0 remains an open question.
21We use the terminology WELM trading equilibrium for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the trading game
induced by the observable quotes model that satisfies: (i) σ1 = σ2 = σ, σ1 = σ2 = σ and σ1 = σ2 = σ; (ii)
σ(0) = 1; (iii) either p ∈ {0, 1} or σ and σ are atomless, with supp (σ) = [0, l] and supp (σ) = [l, u]. See
Online Appendix D.
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information), and ΠS (respectively ΠS) denote the speculator’s equilibrium expected trading
profit when she does not acquire information (resp. when she does acquire information).
We explore first the effect of the observability of the quotes on market participants’ gains
from acquiring information.
Proposition 2. The greater the observability of the quotes the smaller the speculator’s gain
from acquiring information: if p > 0 and q < 1 then ΠS −ΠS is decreasing in z. By contrast,
the observability of the quotes enhances MMs’ gain from acquiring information: if p > 0 and
q < 1 then Πn − Πn is increasing in z.
The first part of the proposition is straightforward. As long as (i) the speculator does
not acquire information with probability 1 and (ii) MMs acquire information with positive
probability then, increasing z: (a) increases the amount of information which the speculator
can retrieve from the quotes, (b) induces MMs to set wider spreads, by exposing uninformed
MMs to greater adverse selection. Both effects in turn decrease the speculator’s incentive to
pay for information. The second part of the proposition is more interesting. As noted above,
increasing z exposes uninformed MMs to greater adverse selection, inducing them to set wider
spreads. The larger spreads of the uninformed MMs enable in turn informed MMs to turn a
greater profit from trading with the liquidity trader.22
Our next result extends Theorem 1.
Theorem 3. There is a one-sided strategic complementarity in information acquisition and,
for π and z sufficiently large, also a strategic complementarity in information acquisition
amongst MMs.23
1. The more information acquired by any market participant the smaller the speculator’s
gain from acquiring information: ΠS − ΠS is decreasing in p and q.
2. By contrast: Πn−Πn is increasing in q and, for π and z sufficiently large, can be either
increasing or decreasing in p.
The logic underlying the one-side strategic complementarity in information acquisition is
as in the baseline model.24 The new result relative to Theorem 1 is the impact of p on MMs’
22This mechanism is naturally akin to the mechanism in Theorem 1 that induced MMs’ gain from information
to increase with q: increasing z indirectly increases information available to the speculator.
23The results hold for all π and z, except where explicitly stated.
24Note however that with z > 0, the adverse effect of p on the speculator’s incentive to acquire information
is even larger than before since now increasing p channels information concerning v to the speculator.
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gain from acquiring information. On one hand, increasing p enhances competition among
MMs for profitable market orders; this effect reduces MMs’ gain from acquiring information,
and led Πn − Πn to be decreasing in p at z = 0. On the other hand, with observable quotes,
increasing p channels additional information to the speculator, exposing uninformed MMs to
greater adverse selection. The larger spreads of the uninformed MMs enable in turn informed
MMs to make greater profits from trading with the liquidity trader. This feedback effect
implies that, if π and z are sufficiently large, then MMs’ gain from acquiring information
increases with p. Hence, the mechanism at play in the one-sided strategic complementarity in
information induces, when quotes are observable, a strategic complementarity in information
acquisition amongst MMs.
The feedback effect highlighted above opens the door to the potential existence of multiple
WELM equilibria, but the model’s main predictions continue to hold. Who acquires infor-
mation crucially depends on the cost of information: when this cost is small, MMs acquire
information and crowd out the speculator; by contrast, when this cost is large, the speculator
acquires information and MMs remain uninformed.
Theorem 4. For any z, there exist 0 < c < c < 1
2
such that, for c ∈ (0, c) ∪ (c, 1
2
), a WELM
equilibrium exists and in any WELM equilibrium:
• if c ∈ (0, c) then MMs acquire information with positive probability but the speculator
remains uninformed;
• if c ∈ (c, 1
2
) then the speculator acquires information with positive probability but MMs
remain uninformed.
Figure 7 illustrates Theorem 4, for π = 3
10
. The dashed (respectively dotted) curve cor-
responds to equilibrium p (resp. q) values in the baseline model, that is, z = 0; the solid
(respectively dash-dotted) curve corresponds to equilibrium p (resp. q) values in the model
with perfectly observable quotes, that is, z = 1. First, notice that q is weakly lower for z = 1
than for z = 0, capturing the fact that observable quotes reduce the speculator’s incentive
to pay for information (Proposition 2). By contrast the cutoff c above which MMs are unin-
formed does not depend on z. To see this, note that if p = 0 is an equilibrium outcome for
z = 0 then p = 0 is also an equilibrium outcome for z = 1: intuitively, if MMs are uninformed
then quote observability has no effect on any of the market participants’ profits. Next, going
from left to right in the figure, observe that whereas MMs initially acquire more information
with observable quotes than without, things eventually reverse within the cost interval where
18
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Figure 7: Equilibrium Information Acquisition:
Baseline vs. Observable Quotes
q is greater for z = 0 than for z = 1. The logic is the following. We saw in Proposition
2 that, fixing p and q, MMs’ gain from acquiring information increases with z. Yet we also
established (Theorem 3) that MMs’ gain from acquiring information increases with q. In the
cost interval where increasing z reduces q, the reduction in q is eventually sufficiently large
that increasing z reduces p. Finally, notice that when q = 1 MMs’ information acquisition
is the same in the baseline and observable quotes models since, being already informed, the
speculator then learns nothing from the quotes.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes information acquisition in dealer markets. We identify a one-sided strate-
gic complementarity in information acquisition: the more informed traders are, the larger
MMs’ gain from becoming informed. We also identify a strategic complementarity in infor-
mation acquisition amongst MMs, that arises when quotes are observable. The paper’s main
result shows that the microstructure of dealer markets pins down information acquisition.
19
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The pattern often assumed in the literature wherein traders are superiorly informed relative
to MMs arises at high costs. But other patterns arise at different costs. In particular, at
small costs, information acquisition is reversed. In that case, MMs are informed, but traders
are not. Furthermore, when most traders are speculators, the speculators choose to acquire
information whereas MMs remain uninformed; by contrast, when most traders are liquidity
traders, MMs acquire information and traders remain uninformed. The model has striking
implications for market liquidity and price discovery: decreasing the cost of information and
increasing the share of speculators can improve liquidity; increasing the cost of information
and decreasing the fraction of speculators can improve price discovery.
Discussion of assumptions. The model we propose is stylized, yet rich enough to deliver
various seemingly robust insights concerning the implications of the microstructure of dealer
markets on incentives to invest in information. The baseline model (Section 2) illustrates
these insights in the simplest possible way. The observable quotes model (Section 6) opens
a new information flow from MMs to traders, since traders benefit from MMs’ information
acquisition via more informative quotes. The fundamental mechanisms, however, are the
same in the two models. Loosely speaking, increasing p in the observable quotes model is like
increasing p and q in the baseline model.
Some of our modelling assumptions are relatively easily relaxed, including the number of
MMs, the probability that V = 1, or even the binary nature of the asset value, V . But two
assumptions appear necessary for the tractability of the model:
(i) There is a single trading round. Introducing multiple trading rounds would imply that
private information leaks to the market through previous quotes and trades, and that
the same information can be used in several trading rounds. In this case, on the one
hand MMs and traders have an incentive to act strategically and hide their private
information so as to use it several times by setting less aggressive quotes or trading less
aggressively, but on the other hand, they also have an incentive to act quickly before the
information of other market participants is disseminated to the market. The reaction to
these incentives will in turn determine how ‘many times’ information can be used, and
how profitable it will be, thus modifying the incentives to acquire information.
(ii) The market participants acquire perfect information concerning V . Of course, in practice
traders and MMs can incur varying costs in order to acquire more or less accurate
information about the assets they trade. One could as a first step improve the realism
20
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of the baseline model (i.e., with unobservable quotes) by supposing that, instead of
observing the realization of V , market participants can, for a cost c > 0, observe the
realization of a binary signal correlated with V . However, noisy signals of V imply that
informed MMs also learn from the order flow.
Relation to empirics. Our findings shed light on several well-documented empirical regu-
larities. First, both traders and MMs may have proprietary information. Manaster and Mann
(1996), for instance, provide evidence in connection with the market for commodity futures,
Li and Heidle (2004) for stockmarkets, and Covrig and Melvin (2002) and Sapp (2002) for the
foreign exchange market. Therefore, traders cannot be viewed purely as uninformed liquidity
traders, and MMs cannot be viewed as only learning from their private knowledge of the order
flow.25
Second, dealer-driven price discovery can be more important than trader-driven price dis-
covery. For stock markets, Anand and Subrahmanyam (2006) find that “... intermediaries
appear to be more informed than all other institutions and individuals combined.” Valseth
(2013) explores government bond markets and compares the informational content of the in-
terdealer and customer order flows: the interdealer order flow explains almost a quarter of
daily yield variation, whereas the customer order flow has little explanatory power.
Third, MMs are often asymmetrically informed. The finding is widely documented (Al-
banesi and Rindi, 2000; Huang, 2002; Massa and Simonov, 2003). In our setting, ex ante
identical MMs play mixed information acquisition strategies in equilibrium, and may there-
fore be ex-post asymmetrically informed.
Fourth, more volatile assets exhibit larger spreads. Stoll (1978) was first to provide evidence
in the case of stocks, while Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007) find that spreads are higher for
corporate bonds with lower rating or higher maturity, which are both associated with higher
price volatility.26 We establish that the bid-ask spread is largest when there is both informed
market making and informed trading. Consequently, in our setting, spreads are maximized
when prices are volatile.27
25MMs acquiring information through this channel have been considered in, for instance, Leach and Mad-
havan (1993), Bloomfield and O’Hara (2000) and de Frutos and Manzano (2005). In this literature, the focus
is on MMs’ incentives to experiment with prices in order to learn new information.
26Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) and Bao, Pan and Wang (2011) find similar evidence, but their
measure of market liquidity is different.
27When MMs randomize between acquiring information and not, each MM is uncertain about the informa-
tion of her competitors. The trading equilibrium thus involves mixing on the part of all MMs.
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Dealer markets, electronic limit order markets and high-frequency trading. In
the spirit of Glosten and Milgrom (1985), our model is that of a classic dealer market, with
MMs supplying liquidity on one side of the market and traders consuming liquidity on the
other. Dealer markets comprise some of the world’s largest financial markets, including foreign
exchange (FX), corporate bond and swap markets (see, e.g., Hasbrouck (2007)). In stock
markets, traditional designated market makers (NYSE specialists, Nasdaq MMs) have largely
been displaced, and replaced by “voluntary”, or “de facto”, market makers.28
More generally, the advent of electronic exchanges has facilitated a rise in the number
of independent firms and investors supplying liquidity by posting limit orders, and a central
feature of the rapidly growing literature on limit order markets is precisely the choice between
liquidity provision and liquidity consumption (e.g. Foucault (1999)). Yet, even though elec-
tronic limit order markets allow traders to choose between demanding and supplying liquidity,
high-frequency traders (HFTs) have a natural advantage in liquidity supply. Limit orders run
the risk of being adversely picked off if the security’s value moves past the limit price and
the limit order is hit before it can be cancelled. HFTs can update limit orders fast and are
therefore less exposed to adverse selection than ordinary traders, who are, in effect, driven out
of market-making activities. Quoting Menkveld (2016), “A formal definition does not exist
but most associate HFT with extremely fast computers running algorithms coded by traders
who trade for their own account. ... These traders typically do not work at the deep-pocket
sell-side banks, but at privately held firms. They therefore need to keep their positions small
and short-lived to keep the capital tied up in margin accounts in check. They trade a lot in-
tradaily and avoid carrying a position overnight. These characterizations suggest that HFTs
are best thought of as a new type of intermediary, ...” Menkveld (2013), for instance, studies
a large HFT and finds that 4 out of 5 positions are passive. Moreover, the HFT makes money
on the spread, but loses money on its positions.
The above observations, combined with the large fixed costs associated with high-frequency
trading, suggest that – as a first approximation – our model and analysis may shed some light
on electronic limit order markets in which HFTs effectively act as MMs. A proper investigation
of information acquisition in such markets is however beyond the scope of our paper. The work
of Budish, Cramton and Shim (2015), for example, constitutes a first step in that direction.
28Even there, traditional designated market makers still play an important role however; see, e.g., Clark-
Joseph, Ye and Zi (2017).
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Appendix A: Proofs of Sections 3 and 4
We first introduce some notation. We sometimes write Πn(p, q), Πn(p, q), ΠS(p, q) and ΠS(p, q)
to make explicit that Πn, Πn, ΠS and ΠS are functions of the (fixed) information acquisition
probabilities of the trading game. Furthermore, we let Πn(b|sell) denote MMnH’s equilibrium
expected profit in the trading game from bidding b conditional on a sell order,29 and similarly
define Πn(b|sell) for MMnU. Finally, let γ := P(V = 0|sell).
Proof of Lemma 1: Follows from Proposition C1, in Online Appendix C. 
Proof of Lemma 2: This is part 6 of Lemma C1, in Online Appendix C. 
Proof of Theorem 1: Consider p, q ∈ (0, 1) (the other cases are similar). The arguments
in the proof of Proposition C1 establish that a trading equilibrium exists, is unique up to the
tie-breaking rule, and satisfies: (i) σ1 = σ2 = σ, σ1 = σ2 = σ and σ1 = σ2 = σ; (ii) σ(0) = 1;
(iii) σ and σ are atomless, with supp (σ) = [0, l] and supp (σ) = [l, u]; (iv) the speculator sells
(resp. buys) with probability 1 when she is informed and V = 0 (resp. V = 1) and abstains





b+ (1− γ)(1− p)σ(b)(1− b) = 0, ∀b ∈ [0, l], (A1)
and MMnU’s equilibrium expected profit from bidding l conditional on a sell order is
Πn(l|sell) = −γ(p+ (1− p)σ(l))l + (1− γ)Πn(l|sell). (A2)













γ + (1− γ)(1− p)
, (A4)
29Notice that by the symmetry of the equilibrium, MMnH’s equilibrium expected trading profit equals
MMnL’s equilibrium expected trading profit, and both equal Πn.
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γ + (1− γ)(1− p)
)
. (A6)
By (A3), γ increases with q. So, by (A6), Πn is increasing in q and decreasing in p. Since
Πn = 0, these observations establish part 2 of the theorem.
We next prove part 1 of the theorem. Since the speculator abstains when she is uninformed,
ΠS = 0. So our goal is to show that ΠS is decreasing in p and q. Observe that, by symmetry
of the bid and ask sides of the market,
ΠS =
∫
b dF (b), (A7)
where F (b) := P(b̂ ≤ b|V = 0). As σ(0) = 1, we can write
F (b) = (1− p)2σ2(b) + 2p(1− p)σ(b) + p2. (A8)
We proceed to show that an increase in either p or q induces an inverse first-order stochastic
dominance shift of F . Pick an arbitrary b ∈ (0, l). First, rearranging (A1) yields
σ(b) =
γpb
(1− p)[(1− γ)(1− b)− γb]
. (A9)
So σ(b) is increasing in p. Moreover, as σ(b) is increasing in γ which itself is increasing in q,

















> 0 implies dF (b)
dp
> 0, while dσ(b)
dq
> 0 implies dF (b)
dq
> 0. An increase in either p
30Since l is in the support of σ, MMnH makes expected profit given by (A5) whenever the trader is hit by
a liquidity shock and sells the asset. By symmetry, MMnL makes expected profit given by (A5) whenever the
trader is hit by a liquidity shock and buys the asset.
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or q therefore induces an inverse first-order stochastic dominance shift of F . Equation (A7)
finishes to show that ΠS is decreasing in p and q. 
Proof of Theorem 2:
Step 1: the equilibrium expected profit functions of the trading game (that is, Πn, ΠS, Πn, ΠS)
are all continuous in p and q.
We have Πn = ΠS = 0, Πn given by (A6), and ΠS given by (A7), with (A8) giving F and
(A9) giving σ. Step 1 ensues.
Step 2: there exists an equilibrium.
Define for i = n, S the set-valued functions
ψi(p, q) :=

{0} if Πi(p, q)− c < Πi(p, q);
[0, 1] if Πi(p, q)− c = Πi(p, q);
{1} if Πi(p, q)− c > Πi(p, q).
For all (p, q) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1], ψi(p, q) is convex. Next, consider sequences {pk}k∈N and {qk}k∈N
converging, respectively, to p† and q†. Suppose the sequence {uk}k∈N converges to u and
satisfies uk ∈ ψi(pk, qk) for all k ∈ N. If ψi(p†, q†) = [0, 1] then u ∈ ψi(p†, q†) is immediate.
By Step 1, Πi and Πi are both continuous in p and q. Therefore ψi(p
†, q†) = {0} implies
ψi(pk, qk) = {0} for all sufficiently large k, and ψi(p†, q†) = {1} implies ψi(pk, qk) = {1}
for all sufficiently large k. This shows that ψi has closed graph. We may therefore apply
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem to the correspondence ψn × ψS. By construction, if (p, q) ∈(
ψn(p, q), ψS(p, q)
)
, an equilibrium exists in which MMs acquire information with probability
p while the speculator acquires information with probability q.
Step 3: any equilibrium is a WELM equilibrium.
It follows from Lemma 2 and the remarks in the main text after the lemma that any
equilibrium has to be such that both MMs acquire information with the same probability.
The other properties are immediate from the arguments in the proof of Proposition C1, in
Online Appendix C.
25
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2875763
Step 4: the equilibrium information acquisition probabilities p and q are uniquely determined.
Assume that an equilibrium exists in which MMs acquire information with probability p ∈
(0, 1) while the speculator acquires information with probability q ∈ (0, 1) (the other cases
are similar). In the rest of the paragraph, we make repeated use of Theorem 1. Suppose by
way of contradiction that an equilibrium exists with information acquisition probabilities p′
and q′, where either p′ 6= p or q′ 6= q. We proceed by cases.
Case 1: p′ = p. If p′ = p then either q′ > q or q′ < q. If q′ > q then ΠS(p
′, q′)−ΠS(p′, q′) <
ΠS(p, q)−ΠS(p, q) = c, contradicting q′ > 0. If q′ < q, then ΠS(p′, q′)−ΠS(p′, q′) > ΠS(p, q)−
ΠS(p, q) = c, contradicting q
′ < 1. This rules out p′ = p.
Case 2: p′ > p. Then, Πn(p
′, q) − Πn(p′, q) < Πn(p, q) − Πn(p, q) ≤ c. As p′ > 0, we
also have Πn(p
′, q′) − Πn(p′, q′) ≥ c. Therefore, q′ > q, which again implies q < 1. But then,
ΠS(p
′, q′)− ΠS(p′, q′) < ΠS(p, q)− ΠS(p, q) ≤ c, contradicting q′ > 0. This rules out p′ > p.
Case 3: p′ < p. Then, Πn(p
′, q) − Πn(p′, q) > Πn(p, q) − Πn(p, q) ≥ c. As p′ < 1, we
also have Πn(p
′, q′) − Πn(p′, q′) ≤ c. Therefore, q′ < q, which again implies q > 0. But then,
ΠS(p
′, q′)− ΠS(p′, q′) > ΠS(p, q)− ΠS(p, q) ≥ c, contradicting q′ < 1. This rules out p′ < p.
The cases above rule out the existence of an equilibrium with information acquisition
probabilities p′ and q′ different from p and q.
Step 5: in equilibrium, p is non-increasing in c.
Consider ca < cb. Let pa and qa (respectively pb and qb) denote the equilibrium information
acquisition probabilities given c = ca (resp. c = cb). Suppose by way of contradiction that
pb > pa. Then
Πn(pa, qa)− Πn(pa, qa) ≤ ca < cb ≤ Πn(pb, qb)− Πn(pb, qb).
Using Theorem 1, this in turn implies qb > qa. But then,
ΠS(pa, qa)− ΠS(pa, qa) ≥ ΠS(pb, qb)− πS(pb, qb) ≥ cb > ca,
contradicting qa < 1.
Step 6: in equilibrium, p→ 1 as c→ 0.
This step is immediate from the arguments given in the text below the statement of
Theorem 2.
26
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2875763
Step 7: in equilibrium, q = 0 for all sufficiently small c.
Notice first that p = 1 implies Πn = 0. Hence, in equilibrium, p < 1. This remark
combined with Step 6 implies that, in equilibrium, Πn−Πn = c for all sufficiently small c and,
as Πn = 0, Πn(p, q) = c, with Πn(p, q) given by (A6). Now, by part 2 of Theorem 1, Πn(p, q)
is decreasing in p but increasing in q. So, for all sufficiently small c, in equilibrium: p ≥ p∗(c),
where p∗(c) is defined implicitly by Πn(p
∗(c), 0) = c. Using (A6) yields
p∗(c) =
1− π − 4c
1− π − 2c
. (A10)
Next, the remark that p ≥ p∗(c) at sufficiently small c combined with part 1 of Theorem 1
shows that, in equilibrium, for all sufficiently small c:
ΠS(p, q)− ΠS(p, q) ≤ ΠS(p∗(c), 0)− ΠS(p∗(c), 0) = ΠS(p∗(c), 0).
Let l(p, q) be given by (A4) and (A3). The informed speculator who observed v = 0 will find
an uninformed MM to sell the asset to with probability 2p(1− p) + (1− p)2 and will at most
obtain the price l(p, q). Since p ≥ p∗(c) and given that l(p, q) is decreasing in p and q, we can
place an upper bound on the speculator’s gain from being informed:
ΠS(p, q)− ΠS(p, q) ≤ [2p∗(c)(1− p∗(c)) + (1− p∗(c))2]l(p∗(c), 0)
= (1− p∗(c))(p∗(c) + 1)l(p∗(c), 0)
≤ 2(1− p∗(c))l(p∗(c), 0). (A11)





Combining (A10), (A11) and (A12) shows that for all sufficiently small c, in equilibrium:
ΠS(p, q)− ΠS(p, q) ≤
8c2
(1− π)(1− π − 2c)
.
Hence, in equilibrium, ΠS(p, q)−ΠS(p, q) < c for all c sufficiently small, concluding the proof
of Step 7.
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Step 8: there exist 0 < c < c < 1
2
such that, in equilibrium, q = 0 if and only if c ≤ c and
p = 0 if and only if c ≥ c.
Follows from Lemmata A1 and A2 below.

Lemma A1. Let c ∈ (0, 1
2
). Then, in equilibrium, the following are equivalent:
(i) p = 0;
(ii) p = 0 < q;
(iii) c ≥ c(π) = 1−π2
4
.
Proof: Fix p = 0 and q = 1, and consider the resulting trading game. With both MMs
uninformed, Bertrand competition yields b̂ = E[V |sell] = 1−π
2
= 1− â. Hence,






(1− â) = 1− π
2
.
On the other hand,
















], the equilibrium information acquisition probabilities are p = 0




) the equilibrium information
acquisition probabilities are p = 0 and q ∈ (0, 1).
We next show that in equilibrium p > 0 for all c < 1−π
2
4




that part 1 of Theorem 1 combined with the derivation of the previous paragraph yields
ΠS(0, q) − ΠS(0, q) ≥ 1−π2 for all q ∈ [0, 1]. So if in equilibrium p = 0 then q = 1. Yet we
saw above that Πn(0, 1)−Πn(0, 1) = 1−π
2
4
. The latter observation rules out the possibility of
p = 0 in equilibrium.

Lemma A2. Let c ∈ (0, 1
2
). Then there exists a monotone decreasing function π(·) such that
in equilibrium q = 0 if and only if π ≤ π(c).
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Step 1: if in equilibrium q = 0 for a given value of π then in equilibrium q = 0 as well for all
smaller values of π.
Consider πb < πa. Let pa and qa (respectively pb and qb) denote the equilibrium information
acquisition probabilities given π = πa (resp. π = πb). Suppose that qa = 0. We will show that
qb = 0 as well. First, (A6) yields









By Lemma A1, pa > 0. Since in equilibrium MMs always acquire information with probability
less than 1, pa ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, using Πn(pa, 0; πa) − Πn(pa, 0;πa) = c and solving for pa
gives
pa =
1− πa − 4c




1− πb − 4c
1− πb − 2c
.











b, 0;πb)− Πn(p′b, 0;πb) = c. (A14)
On the other hand, observe that fixing q = 0, the speculator’s expected profit functions ΠS
and ΠS in the trading game are independent of π, since for q = 0 none of the price distributions
depend on π. This remark, combined with part 1 of Theorem 1, yields
ΠS(p
′
b, 0;πb)− ΠS(p′b, 0;πb) < ΠS(pa, 0;πa)− ΠS(pa, 0;πa) ≤ c. (A15)
It now follows from (A14) and (A15) that p′b and 0 are the equilibrium information acquisition
probabilities given π = πb. This concludes the proof of Step 1.
In what follows, let
p∗(c, π) :=
1− π − 4c
1− π − 2c
. (A16)
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∗(c, π), 0) = c.
Immediate from (A6).





Suppose π(c) > 0. Then we can find a sequence {πk}k∈N, with limit π(c), such that in
equilibrium: π = πk implies q = qk = 0. Hence, by Lemma A1, for all k sufficiently large, in
equilibrium: π = πk implies p = pk > 0. Therefore, Πn(pk, 0) = Πn(pk, 0) − Πn(pk, 0) = c for
all k sufficiently large. We conclude, using Step 2 and the monotonicity of Πn with respect
to p, that pk = p
∗(c, πk) for all k sufficiently large. As ΠS(pk, 0) ≤ c irrespective of k, we
find that ΠS(p
∗(c, πk), 0) ≤ c for all k sufficiently large. Now, we saw in Step 1 of the proof
of Theorem 2 that ΠS is continuous in p. Moreover, (A16) shows that p










Step 4: π(c) > 0 implies π(c) < 1− 4c.
Suppose π(c) > 0. Reasoning as in Step 3 establishes that p∗(c, π(c)) ≥ 0. Hence, by
(A16), π(c) ≤ 1 − 4c. Next, suppose by way of contradiction that π(c) = 1 − 4c. Then,
p∗(c, π(c)) = 0. Hence, by Step 3: ΠS(0, 0) = c. But that is impossible, since ΠS(0, 0) =
1
2
whereas c < 1
2
.
Step 5: π(.) is continuous.
Step 5 follows from Step 3 and the remarks that ΠS is continuous in p while p
∗ is continuous
in both of its arguments.
Step 6: π(ca) > 0 implies π(cb) < π(ca) for all cb ∈ (ca, 12).
Suppose by way of contradiction that there exist 0 < ca < cb <
1
2
with 0 < π(ca) ≤ π(cb).





with 0 < π(ca) = π(c
′
b).
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c = ca and once at c = c
′
b, contradicting Lemma C2 in Online Appendix C.

Proof of Proposition 1: Combining Lemmata A1 and A2 establishes the main part of the
proposition. We prove the remaining parts below.
Claim: the equilibrium q tends to 0 as π tends to 1.
Suppose by way of contradiction that the equilibrium probability q with which the spec-
ulator acquires information does not tend to 0 as π tends to 1. Then we can find ε > 0
and a sequence {πk}k∈N with limit 1 such that each element in the equilibrium sequence qk is
greater than ε. Therefore, by (A3), γk converges to 1 and, by (A4), lk converges to 0. Yet, by
symmetry of the bid and ask sides of the market:
ΠS(pk, qk)− ΠS(pk, qk) = ΠS(pk, qk) ≤ lk.
Therefore, ΠS(pk, qk)− ΠS(pk, qk) < c for all sufficiently large k, contradicting qk > ε.
Claim: the equilibrium probability p with which a MM acquires information is
non-increasing in π.
First, using (A6) gives us
∂2Πn(p, q)
∂π2
= − 4(1− p)
2q2
[(2− p)(1− π) + 2πq]3
≤ 0.












Next, by (A9), ∂σ(b)
∂γ
≥ 0. As ∂γ
∂π
≥ 0, we obtain ∂σ(b)
∂π
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Now consider πb > πa. Let pa and qa (resp. pb and qb) denote the equilibrium information
acquisition probabilities given π = πa (resp. π = πb). Suppose by way of contradiction that
pb > pa. Then
Πn(pb, qb; πb) ≥ c ≥ Πn(pa, qa; πa).
As πb > πa and pb > pa, we conclude by (A17) and part 2 of Theorem 1 that qb > qa. But
then (A18) and part 1 of Theorem 1 give
ΠS(pb, qb; πb) < ΠS(pa, qa; πa),
contradicting qb > qa.

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Appendix B: Proofs of Section 6
We first introduce some notation. We sometimes write Πn(p, q; z), Πn(p, q; z), ΠS(p, q; z) and
ΠS(p, q; z) to make explicit that Πn, Πn, ΠS and ΠS are functions of the (fixed) informa-
tion acquisition probabilities of the trading game, and of the probability that the quotes are
observed.
Proof of Proposition 2: By Proposition D1, in any WELM trading equilibrium:





1− π(1− 2q) + 2πp(1− q)z




(1 + π(2z − 1) + 2πq(1− z))pb
(1− p)(1− π − 2b(1− π(1− q)))
, ∀b ∈ [0, l]. (B2)




(1− p)2p(1− π)2π(1− q)
(2− p− 2π(1− q) + πp(1 + 2(1− q)z))2
> 0.
As Πn(p, q; z) = 0 in a WELM trading equilibrium (see Online Appendix D), MMn’s gain
from becoming informed therefore increases in z.
Next, in any WELM trading equilibrium:
ΠS(p, q; z) = 2p(1− p)
∫ l
0




If both MMs are informed then the informed speculator makes zero profit. With probability
2(1− p)p one MM is informed and the other is uninformed. In this case, by symmetry of the
bid and ask sides of the market, the informed speculator’s expected profit equals the expected
bid of the uninformed MM. With probability (1−p)2 both MMs are uninformed. In this case,
by symmetry of the bid and ask sides of the market, the informed speculator’s expected profit
equals the expected maximum bid of the uninformed MMs. On the other hand,




If the speculator does not acquire information, MMn is informed, quotes are observable and
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MMm is uninformed then the speculator learns v from MMn’s quotes and makes profit from
trading with MMm. Thus, the speculator’s gain from acquiring information is
ΠS(p, q; z)− ΠS(p, q; z) = 2(1− z)p(1− p)
∫ l
0




Now, by (B2), σ(b) is increasing in z. So the right-hand side of (B3) decreases in z. 
Proposition B1. Let z = 1. There exists p̂ < 1, independent of q, such that, for all p > p̂,
Πn −Πn is decreasing in p. There exists q̂ < 1 such that, for all q > q̂, Πn −Πn is decreasing
in p. If π > 1
3
then, for p and q sufficiently small, Πn − Πn is increasing in p.





2(2π(p− 1)q − 3πp+ p+ 2π − 2)2
,
where A(p, q) is a continuous function of p and q that takes the values A(0, 0) = (1− π)(3π−
1), and A(1, q) = A(p, 1) = −(1 + π)2. Continuity of the partial derivative together with
Πn(p, q; z) = 0 then yields the desired result. 
Proof of Theorem 3: In any WELM trading equilibrium, Πn is given by (B1). Taking the




(1− p)2(1− π)2π(1− zp)
(2(1− π(1− q)) + 2πpz(1− q)− p(1− π))2
> 0.
As Πn(p, q; z) = 0, MMn’s gain from becoming informed therefore increases in q. The compar-
ative statics result relative to p for MMn follows from Proposition B1. For the comparative
statics results pertaining to the speculator, notice that by (B2), σ(b) is increasing in p and q.
So the right-hand side of (B3) decreases in p and q. 
Proof of Theorem 4: Suppose z = 1 (the proof for the case z ∈ (0, 1) is almost identical). In
the rest of the proof, let p0 (resp. q0) denote MMs’ (resp. the speculator’s) unique equilibrium
information acquisition probability in any equilibrium with z = 0. Let c and c denote the
cutoffs from Theorem 2.
34
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2875763
Step 1: there exists c† such that, for all c < c†, a WELM equilibrium exists and satisfies p ≥ p0
and q = 0.
Recall: (a) p0 tends to 1 as c tends to 0, and (b) by Proposition D3, a WELM trading










1−π for all c < c̃.
Consider c < min{c̃, c}. Then, using Proposition 2,
Πn(p0, 0; 1)− Πn(p0, 0; 1) > Πn(p0, 0; 0)− Πn(p0, 0; 0) ≥ c.
Next, as Πn(1, 0; 1)− Πn(1, 0; 1) = 0, the intermediate value theorem gives p∗ > p0 solving
Πn(p
∗, 0; 1)− Πn(p∗, 0; 1) = c.
As p∗ > p0, Proposition 2 and Theorem 3 give
ΠS(p
∗, 0; 1)− ΠS(p∗, 0; 1) < ΠS(p0, 0; 0)− ΠS(p0, 0; 0) ≤ c.
A WELM equilibrium therefore exists, with p = p∗ and q = 0.
Step 2: for all p̂ < 1, there exists ĉ > 0 such that, in any equilibrium, p > p̂ whenever c < ĉ.
As uninformed MMs never set bid prices above 1
2
nor set ask prices below 1
2
, MMn’s gain
from being informed in the trading game is at least as large as (1−p)(1−π)
4




Step 3: there exists ĉ > 0 such that, in any WELM equilibrium, p ≥ p0 for all c < ĉ.
Choose p̂ < 1 such that Πn − Πn is decreasing in p for all p > p̂ (such a p̂ exists, by
Proposition B1). Now pick ĉ such that, for all c < ĉ: (a) q0 = 0 and (b) p > p̂ in any
WELM equilibrium (such a ĉ exists, by virtue of Theorem 2 combined with Step 2 of the
proof). Let c < ĉ and suppose by way of contradiction that a WELM equilibrium exists
satisfying p̂ < p < p0. Then Πn(p, q; 1) − Πn(p, q; 1) = c. We have on the other hand,
Πn(p0, 0; 0)−Πn(p0, 0; 0) ≥ c. Yet, our choice of p̂ combined with Proposition 2 and Theorem
3 implies
Πn(p, q; 1)− Πn(p, q; 1) > Πn(p0, 0; 0)− Πn(p0, 0; 0),
which clearly cannot be.
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Step 4: in any WELM equilibrium, q = 0 for all c < ĉ.
Recall, we chose ĉ such that q0 = 0 for all c < ĉ. So Step 4 is immediate from Step 3
combined with the fact that, by Proposition 2 and Theorem 3, ΠS − ΠS is decreasing in p, q
and z.







, a WELM equilibrium exists and satisfies p = 0 < q.
Theorem 2 and the observation made in the text that c = (1−π)(1+π)
4
give p0 = 0 <







. Proposition D3 assures the existence of a WELM trading
equilibrium whenever p = 0. The existence of a WELM equilibrium satisfying p = p0, q = q0,
Πn(p0, q0; 1) = Πn(p0, q0; 0), ΠS(p0, q0; 1) = ΠS(p0, q0; 0), Πn(p0, q0; 1) = Πn(p0, q0; 0), and
ΠS(p0, q0; 1) = ΠS(p0, q0; 0) is now straightforward to verify.




), p = 0 < q in any WELM equilibrium.
Recall, c > c = (1−π)(1+π)
4
implies p0 = 0 < q0. Let c ∈ (1−π2 ,
1
2
). In any WELM equilibrium,
MMs’ gain from acquiring information is bounded above by 1−π
2
. So p = 0 in any WELM
equilibrium. Moreover, combining Theorems 2 and 3 implies that, for all q < q0:
ΠS(0, q; 1)− ΠS(0, q; 1) > ΠS(0, q0; 1)− ΠS(0, q0; 1) = ΠS(0, q0; 0)− ΠS(0, q0; 0) = c.
We conclude that q ≥ q0 in any WELM equilibrium.

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Appendix C: Trading Game of Baseline Model (for online
publication)
In this appendix we analyze the trading game induced by the baseline model. Specifically,
throughout this appendix p1, p2 and q play the role of parameters: MMn is informed with
probability pn, and the speculator is informed with probability q. A strategy of MMn com-
prises cumulative distribution functions σn, σn and σn specifying respectively the distribution
of the bid price bn of MMnU, MMnL and MMnH. We assume in line with the baseline model
that, conditional on MMnU, 1 − an is distributed like bn. Similarly, we assume that the law
of 1 − an conditional on MMnL (resp. MMnH) is the same as the law of bn conditional on
MMnH (resp. MMnL). A strategy of the speculator specifies her market order as a function
of the information she possesses at that point.
The following notation will be used throughout:
• Πn(b|sell) (respectively Πn(b|sell) and Πn(b|sell)) for MMnU’s (resp. MMnH’s and
MMnL’s) expected trading profit conditional on a sell order, given bn = b;
• σn(b) := P(bn ≤ b| MMnU), σn(b) := P(bn ≤ b| MMnH) and σn(b) := P(bn ≤ b| MMnL);
• Σn := supp (σn) and Σn := supp (σn) ;
• An (respectively An) for the set of atoms in MMnU’s (resp. MMnH’s) strategy;
• ln := sup Σn;
• γ := P(V = 0|sell).
Lemma C1. If p1 = p2 = 1 then any trading equilibrium has a1 = a2 = b1 = b2 = V .
If p1 = p2 = 0 then a1 = a2 =
1−π(1−2q)
2−2π(1−q) and b1 = b2 =
1−π
2−2π(1−q) . Otherwise, any trading
equilibrium satisfies the following properties:
1. σ1(0) = σ2(0) = 1;
2. Σ1 ∪ Σ1 = Σ2 ∪ Σ2 = [0, u], where u ∈ (0, 1);
3. A1 ∪ A1 ∪ A2 ∪ A2 ⊆ {0};
4. if pm ∈ (0, 1) then Σm ∩ Σm = {lm} and lm < u, with lm > 0 if and only if pn < 1;
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5. if 1 > pn ≥ pm > 0 then E[V |sell] > lm ≥ ln > 0, with lm > ln if pn > pm;
6. if pn > pm then 0 = Πm < Πn < Πn = Πm.
Proof: The cases p1 = p2 = 1 and p1 = p2 = 0 are trivial. We prove below that, in any trading
equilibrium, properties 1-6 hold in the case min{p1, p2} ∈ (0, 1), that is, when both market
MMs acquire information with positive probability but neither of them becomes informed
with probability 1; the proof for the case pm = 0 < pn is similar.
Step 1: σ1(0) = σ2(0) = 1. Suppose by way of contradiction that σ1(0) < 1. Then we can
find b′ > 0 with b′ ∈ arg maxb Π1(b|sell) and P(b1 ≥ b′| MM1L) > 0. The previous remarks
imply P(b1 = b′ wins|V = 0) = 0, for otherwise Π1(b′|V = 0) = −P(b1 = b′ wins|V = 0)b′ <
0 = Π1(0|V = 0). Next, P(b1 = b′ wins|V = 0) = 0 implies the existence of b′′ ≥ b′ with
b′′ ∈ arg maxb Π2(b|sell) and P(b2 = b′′ wins|V = 0) > 0. We therefore obtain Π2(b′′|sell) <
0 = Π2(0|sell), which cannot be.
Step 2: pn ∈ (0, 1)⇒ ln ≤ inf Σn. Suppose by way of contradiction that ln > inf Σn. Then
we can find b′′ > b′ with b′′ ∈ arg maxb Πn(b|sell) and b′ ∈ arg maxb Πn(b|sell). Next,
Πn(b
′′|sell) = −γP(bn = b′′ wins|V = 0)b′′ + (1− γ)P(bn = b′′ wins|V = 1)(1− b′′)
= −γP(bn = b′′ wins|V = 0)b′′ + (1− γ)Πn(b′′|sell)
< −γP(bn = b′′ wins|V = 0)b′ + (1− γ)Πn(b′′|sell)
≤ −γP(bn = b′ wins|V = 0)b′ + (1− γ)Πn(b′|sell)
= Πn(b
′|sell).
The last inequality holds since b′ < b′′ and P(bn wins|V = 0) is non-decreasing in bn. Thus
Πn(b
′|sell) > Πn(b′′|sell) = maxb Πn(b|sell), which cannot be.
Step 3: 0 < sup Σ1 = sup Σ2 < 1. We start by showing that sup Σ1 = sup Σ2. Suppose by way
of contradiction that this is not the case, say un > um, where un = sup Σn and um = sup Σm.
Then, since increasing the bid beyond um + ε does not increase the winning probability for n,
∃ ε > 0 such that
Πn(um + ε|sell) > Πn(un − x|sell), ∀x ∈ [0, ε],
contradicting un ∈ Σn. Hence, un = um. Next, let u denote the common supremum; we claim
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that u ∈ (0, 1). Suppose by way of contradiction that u = 0. One of the two MMs does
not win with probability 1 conditional on a tie at 0, say P(bn = 0 wins|bn = bm = 0) < 1.
Then bidding slightly above zero yields MMnH strictly larger expected profit than bn = 0,
Πn(ε|sell) > Πn(0|sell), contradicting u = 0. Next, suppose by way of contradiction that
u = 1. Then maxb Πn(b|sell) = 0, for n = 1, 2. However, min{p1, p2} ∈ (0, 1). Say pm < 1;





(1−pm) > 0, contradicting maxb Πn(b|sell) = 0.
Step 4: pn = 1⇒ lm = 0; max{p1, p2} < 1⇒ max{l1, l2} < E[V |sell]. The first part is trivial;
we prove the second part. By Step 1, for both MMs and given any bid b, the probability of
winning a sell order is maximized under V = 0. Hence, for all b,
E[V |sell, bn = b wins] ≤ E[V |sell].
This implies, in turn, ln ≤ E[V |sell], otherwise MMnU could profitably deviate to bn = 0.
Now suppose max{p1, p2} < 1 and, by way of contradiction, that lm = E[V |sell]. We consider
two cases, u = E[V |sell] (Case 1) and u > E[V |sell] (Case 2). In Case 1, Step 2 gives
u = E[V |sell] ∈ Am. But then bidding slightly above u yields MMnH strictly larger expected
profit than bn = u: ∃ ε > 0 such that
Πn(u+ ε|sell) > Πn(u− x|sell), ∀x ∈ [0, ε],
contradicting u = sup Σn. Consider next Case 2. Note that in this case, by virtue of Steps 1
and 2, there exists δ > 0 with
P(bm = b wins|V = 1) < P(bm = b wins|V = 0)− δ, ∀b ≤ E[V |sell].
Thus, ∃ δ′ > 0 such that
E[V |sell, bm = b wins] < E[V |sell]− δ′, ∀b ≤ E[V |sell].
We therefore obtain
Πm(b|sell) = P(bm = b wins)
(
E[V |sell, bm = b wins]− b
)
< 0, ∀b ∈
[
E[V |sell]− δ′,E[V |sell]
]
,
giving lm ≤ E[V |sell]− δ′.
39













= ∅ is trivial. Next, suppose by








. Then b < E[V |sell], by
virtue of Step 4. Let ∆ = E[V |sell]− b, and consider n such that P(MMn wins|tie at b) < 1.
Notice that Πn(b + ε∆|sell, bm = b) = E[V |sell] − b − ε∆ as (i) given bm = b, bn = b + ε∆
always wins, and (ii) conditional on bm = b, MMm is uninformed with probability 1, from
which E[V |sell, bm = b] = E[V |sell]. Then,
Πn(b+ ε∆|sell)− Πn(b|sell)
= P(bm = b)
(
Πn(b+ ε∆|sell, bm = b)− Πn(b|sell, bm = b)
)
+ (1− P(bm = b))
(
Πn(b+ ε∆|sell, bm 6= b)− Πn(b|sell, bm 6= b)
)
= P(bm = b)
(
E[V |sell]− b− ε∆− P(MMn wins|tie at b)∆
)
+ (1− P(bm = b))
(
Πn(b+ ε∆|sell, bm 6= b)− Πn(b|sell, bm 6= b)
)
= P(bm = b)
(
(1− ε)∆− P(MMn wins|tie at b)∆
)
+ (1− P(bm = b))
(





Πn(b+ ε∆|sell, bm 6= b)− Πn(b|sell, bm 6= b)
)








1− P(MMn wins|tie at b)
)
∆ > 0,









. Assume max{p1, p2} < 1 (other cases are similar),








= inf Σ2. Suppose by way of
contradiction that b = inf Σn > inf Σm = b




, otherwise we could find
ε > 0 such that
Πn(b− ε|sell) > Πn(b+ x|sell), ∀x ∈ [0, ε],
contradicting b = inf Σn, as then MMn could benefit from bidding below b. Applying Step




. Next, b = inf Σn together with b /∈ An implies σn(b) = 0.
Therefore, using Steps 1 and 2, b ∈ Am would imply Πm(b|sell) = −γpnb < 0, which cannot
40
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2875763
be. Similarly, b ∈ Am would imply Πm(b|sell) = 0, which cannot be since, by virtue of Steps
2 and 3, maxb Πm(b|sell) > 0.

















= inf Σ2. Let b denote the common infinimum
uncovered in Step 6, and suppose for a contradiction that b > 0. By Step 5, one of the MMs




. Then, by Step 1,
lim
ε→0
Πm(b+ ε|sell) = −γpnb < 0,
contradicting b ∈ Σm.











(the other case is similar). Then b′ ∈ arg maxb Πn(b|sell).





∅. Hence MMn can lower his bid at b′ without decreasing his winning probability, giving
Πn(b
′ − δ|sell) > Πn(b′|sell) = maxb Πn(b|sell), which cannot be.
Step 9: Σ1 ∪ Σ1 = Σ2 ∪ Σ2 = [0, u]. By Steps 2, 3, 7 and 8 all that remains to be shown is that
the common support is an interval. Suppose by way of contradiction that this is not the case.









. Hence, ∃ ε > 0 such that, ∀x ∈ [0, ε],
Πm(b




Step 10: pn ∈ (0, 1)⇒ ln < u. Suppose by way of contradiction that pn ∈ (0, 1) and ln = u.
Then, by Step 2, u ∈ An. Assume P(MMm wins|tie at u) < 1 (the other case is similar).
Then there exists ε > 0 such that
Πm(u+ ε|sell) > Πm(u− x|sell), ∀x ∈ [0, ε],
contradicting u ∈ Σm.
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Step 11: A1 ∪ A1 ∪ A2 ∪ A2 ⊆ {0}. Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists b ∈(
Am ∪ Am
)
, with b > 0. Then, by virtue of Step 4, ∃ ε > 0 such that, ∀x ∈ (0, ε), Πn(b +






Step 12: maxb Π1(b|sell) = maxb Π2(b|sell). The combination of Steps 2, 3 and 11 shows that
maxb Π1(b|sell) = Π1(u|sell) = (1− u) = Π2(u|sell) = maxb Π2(b|sell).
Step 13: 0 < pm < pn < 1⇒ 0 < ln < lm. Let 0 < pm < pn < 1 and suppose by way of con-
tradiction that ln ≥ lm. Note first that ln > 0, for otherwise {0} ∈ An ∩ Am, which Step
5 ruled out. Hence, by Step 11, neither MM has an atom at ln. Steps 2 and 9 therefore
yield maxb Πn(b|sell) = Πn(ln|sell) and maxb Πm(b|sell) = Πm(ln|sell). On the other hand,







contradicting Step 12. Therefore, ln < lm. We next show that ln > 0. Suppose by way of
contradiction that ln = 0. Then 0 ∈ An, and, applying Step 5, 0 /∈ Am. We therefore obtain
Πn(0|sell) = max
b
Πn(b|sell) = 0 < max
b
Πm(b|sell). (C1)
Yet, as lm > 0, Steps 9, 11 and 12 give
Πn(lm|sell) = −γlm + (1− γ)Πn(lm|sell)
= −γlm + (1− γ)Πm(lm|sell)
= Πm(lm|sell),
contradicting (C1).
Step 14: pn > pm ⇒ 0 = Πm < Πn < Πn = Πm. Assume 0 < pm < pn < 1 (other cases are
similar). By Step 12, Πn = Πm. Moreover, Steps 1,2, 9, 11 and 13 give
Πn(ln|sell) = −γ
(
pm + (1− pm)σm(ln)
)
ln + (1− γ)Πn(ln|sell) < Πn(ln|sell).
Hence Πn < Πn (by symmetry of the bid and ask sides of the market). We next show that
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Πn > Πm. Reasoning like we did above, and using Step 12 together with ln < lm,
Πn(ln|sell) = −γ
(
pm + (1− pm)σm(ln)
)
ln + (1− γ)Πn(ln|sell)
> −γlm + (1− γ)Πn(ln|sell)
= −γlm + (1− γ)Πm(lm|sell)
= Πm(lm|sell).
Hence, Πn > Πm. Lastly, we show that Πm = 0. Suppose by way of contradiction that





thus obtain Πn = 0 < Πm, contradicting Πn > Πm.

Proposition C1. For all p1, p2 and q, a trading equilibrium exists. Moreover, except for
p1 = p2 = q = 0 and p1 = p2 = 1, any two trading equilibria induce the same strategies and
differ at most by the tie-breaking rules they induce.31 For all p1, p2 and q, Πn, Πn, ΠS and
ΠS are independent of the trading equilibrium considered.
Proof: The cases p1 = p2 = 0 and p1 = p2 = 1 are trivial. We prove below the existence of
a trading equilibrium and the uniqueness of the strategies for 0 < pm ≤ pn < 1 and q > 0
(other cases are similar).
We start by showing that in any trading equilibrium the speculator sells (resp. buys)
with probability 1 when she is informed and V = 0 (resp. V = 1), and abstains when she is
uninformed. First note that, by Lemma C1, b̂ < 1 with probability 1. So selling the asset is
a strictly dominated strategy of the informed speculator when V = 1. Similarly, buying the
asset is a strictly dominated strategy of the informed speculator when V = 0. Next, Suppose
by way of contradiction that the speculator abstains with positive probability when she is
informed and V = 0 (the other case is similar, by symmetry). Then P(b̂ = 0|V = 0) = 1,
otherwise the speculator would have a profitable deviation. But then σ1(0) = σ2(0) = 1,
contradicting Step 5 in the proof of Lemma C1. We conclude that the speculator sells (resp.
buys) with probability 1 when she is informed and V = 0 (resp. V = 1). We now prove
that the speculator abstains when she is uninformed. Applying Lemma C1 gives u < 1 and
max{l1, l2} < E[V |sell]. As we showed above that the speculator buys (resp. sells) with
probability 1 when she is informed and V = 1 (resp. V = 0), we obtain E[V |sell] < 1
2
. The
31If p1 = p2 = q = 0 then the uninformed speculator is indifferent between trading and abstaining. If
p1 = p2 = 1 then any type of the speculator is indifferent between trading and abstaining.
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uninformed speculator’s expected profit from selling the asset is therefore bounded above by






+ P(sell order executed by an informed MM)(u− 1) < 0.
By symmetry, the uninformed speculator’s expected profit from buying the asset is negative
as well.
We next derive equilibrium strategies of the MMs. Since we saw above that in any trading









) in any trading equilibrium. Now, by virtue of Lemma C1, if the pricing
strategies σm, σn, σm, σn, σm and σn are in equilibrium then σm(0) = σn(0) = 1 and there
exist 0 < ln ≤ lm < u < 1 such that:[
(1− pm) + pmσm(x)
]
(1− x) = 1− u, ∀x ∈ [lm, u]; (C2)[
(1− pn) + pnσn(x)
]
(1− x) = 1− u, ∀x ∈ [lm, u]; (C3)
σm(lm) = 0; (C4)
−γlm + (1− γ)(1− u) = 0; (C5)
−γx+ (1− γ)
[
(1− pn) + pnσn(x)
]
(1− x) = 0, ∀x ∈ [ln, lm]; (C6)
(1− pm)σm(x)(1− x) = 1− u, ∀x ∈ [ln, lm]; (C7)
σn(ln) = 0; (C8)
−γ
[
pm + (1− pm)σm(x)
]
x+ (1− γ)(1− pm)σm(x)(1− x)
= −γ
[
pm + (1− pm)σm(ln)
]
ln + (1− γ)(1− pm)σm(ln)(1− ln), ∀x ∈ [0, ln]; (C9)
−γ
[
pn + (1− pn)σn(x)
]
x+ (1− γ)(1− pn)σn(x)(1− x) = 0, ∀x ∈ [0, ln]. (C10)
Equations (C2) and (C3) are the equiprofit conditions of, respectively, MMnH and MMmH in
the bid range [lm, u]; (C4) is obtained by definition of lm; equation (C5) captures Πm(lm|sell) =
0; equations (C6) and (C7) are the equiprofit conditions of, respectively, MMmU and MMnH
in the bid range [ln, lm]; (C8) is obtained by definition of ln; lastly, equations (C9) and (C10)
are the equiprofit conditions of, respectively, MMnU and MMmU in the bid range [0, ln]. That
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the system of equations (C2)-(C10) uniquely determines pricing strategies σm, σn, σm and σn
is straightforward to check.32
By construction the strategies above are in equilibrium if no MM can profitably bid outside
the support of their respective strategies. Observe to begin with that no MM can profitably
bid outside [0, u]. So we only need to check the remaining cases. To see that MMmU has no
profitable deviation to b ∈ (lm, u] note that
Πm(b|sell) = −γb+ (1− γ)
[
(1− pn) + pnσn(b)
]
(1− b), ∀b ∈ [lm, u].
Hence, by (C3),
Πm(b|sell) = −γb+ (1− γ)(1− u), ∀b ∈ [lm, u].
The last highlighted equation gives Πm(b|sell) < Πm(lm|sell), for all b ∈ (lm, u]. Similarly, to
see that MMmH has no profitable deviation to b ∈ [ln, lm) note that, by (C6),
Πm(b|sell) =
[
(1− pn) + pnσn(b)
]
(1− b) = γb
1− γ
, ∀b ∈ [ln, lm].
Hence Πm(b|sell) < Πm(lm|sell) for all b ∈ [ln, lm). MMmH has no profitable deviation to
b ∈ [0, ln] either, since, by (C10),
Πm(b|sell) = (1− pn)σn(b)(1− b) =
γ
[




, ∀b ∈ [0, ln]. (C11)
Therefore, Πm(b|sell) ≤ Πm(ln|sell) for all b ∈ [0, ln], which, combined with the previous
remark, gives Πm(b|sell) < Πm(lm|sell) for all b ∈ [0, ln]. This finishes to show that neither
MMmU nor MMmH can profitably bid outside the support of their respective strategies.
Similar arguments establish that neither MMnU nor MMnH can profitably bid outside the
support of their respective strategies.
Lastly, Step 5 in the proof of Lemma C1 shows that for a tie to occur with positive
probability requires both MMs to be informed, and either V = 0 and a sell order or V = 1
and a buy order. So MMs’ profits are zero conditional on a tie, irrespective of the tie-breaking
rule. It follows that uniqueness of the strategies implies uniqueness of Πn, Πn, ΠS and ΠS.
32Combining (C2) and (C4) pins down lm in terms of u; (C5) then gives u and, therefore, lm as well.
Applying (C2) and (C3) now gives σm and σn over the interval [lm, u]. Next, Combining (C6) and (C8) pins
down ln, while (C6) and (C7) then give σn and σm over the interval [ln, lm]. Finally (C9) and (C10) give σm
and σn over the interval [ln, lm].
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
The following technical lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma C2. Let p∗(c, π) be given by (A16) and











Proof: Consider any equilibrium of the trading game with q = 0 and a given, arbitrary, p.
Define β := E[bn|MMn is uninformed] and β̂ := E[bn|both MMs uninformed, bn ≥ bm]. By
symmetry of the bid and ask sides of the market, we can write














































(1− p)2 + p(1− p)β. (C13)






















(1− π − 2c)2
[







+ c(1− π − 2c)(2c+ π)
]
.
Let G(c; π) denote the expression inside the square bracket. One verifies that:
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(i) G(0;π) = 0;






(iii) G′(0;π) < 0 < G′′(0;π);












33On the interval (0, 1−π4 ), the function G is first convex, then concave. The function starts below the
horizontal axis, and ends above it. Suppose it crossed the horizontal axis twice. Then at the second crossing,
the function has to be decreasing and concave. But this contradicts G ending above the horizontal axis.
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Appendix D: Trading Game with Observable Quotes (for
online publication)
In this appendix we analyze the trading game induced by the observable quotes model, with
z > 0 denoting the probability with which the speculator gets to observe the quotes before
placing her market order. Specifically, throughout this appendix p and q play the role of
parameters: each MM acquires information with probability p, while the speculator acquires
information with probability q. A strategy of MMn comprises cumulative distribution func-
tions σn, σn and σn specifying respectively the distribution of the bid price bn of MMnU,
MMnL and MMnH. As the bid and ask sides of the market are symmetric we assume as usual
that, conditional on MMnU, 1 − an is distributed like bn. Similarly, we assume that the law
of 1 − an conditional on MMnL (resp. MMnH) is the same as the law of bn conditional on
MMnH (resp. MMnL). A strategy of the speculator specifies her market order as a function
of the information she possesses at that point. A WELM trading equilibrium is a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium such that
(i) σ1 = σ2 = σ, σ1 = σ2 = σ and σ1 = σ2 = σ;
(ii) σ(0) = 1;
(iii) either p ∈ {0, 1} or σ and σ are atomless, with supp (σ) = [0, l] and supp (σ) = [l, u].
We focus throughout this appendix on p ∈ (0, 1) and q < 1. The case p = 0 is almost identical.
If q = 1, the observability of the quotes is inconsequential. The case p = 1 is straightforward:
both MMs set prices equal to the realized asset value. Lastly, to shorten the exposition, we
introduce the indicator variables IS, In and Z respectively equal to 1 if and only if (a) the
speculator acquires information, (b) MMn acquires information, (c) quotes are observable.






1− π(1− 2q) + 2πp(1− q)z
2− p− 2π(1− q) + πp(1 + 2(1− q)z)
; (D1)
σ(b) =
(1 + π(2z − 1) + 2πq(1− z))pb
(1− p)(1− π − 2b(1− π(1− q)))
, ∀b ∈ [0, l]; (D2)
σ(b) =
2Πn(p, q)− (1− p)(1− π)(1− b)
(1− b)(1− π)p
, ∀b ∈ [l, u]; (D3)
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l =
(1− π)(1− p)
2− p− 2π(1− q) + πp(1 + 2(1− q)z)
; (D4)
u =
1− π − 2Πn(p, q)
1− π
. (D5)
In particular, Πn(p, q), l and u given by, respectively, (D1), (D4) and (D5) satisfy Πn(p, q) > 0
and 0 < l < u < 1.
Proof: We start with a few preliminary remarks. Observe that WELM equilibria are separat-




= 1 implies that, on the
equilibrium path, the speculator learns the realization of V . In this case, by sequential ratio-
nality, the speculator buys if V = 1 and sells if V = 0.34 On the equilibrium path sell orders are
thus more likely conditional on V = 0 than they are conditional on V = 1, implying l < 1
2
.35
Hence, on the equilibrium path, the speculator abstains whenever IS ∨
(
(I1 ∨ I2) ∧ Z
)
= 0.36
Next, by definition of a WELM trading equilibrium, MMnU’s expected profit on the bid
side of the market has to be zero (the same being true of course on the ask side of the market).37























(1− p)σ(b)(1− b) = 0, ∀b ∈ [0, l].
(D6)
The first term in equation (D6) can be decomposed as follows. With probability 1
2
the asset
value is V = 0, in which case a winning bid b induces a loss equal to b. With probability π the
trader is a speculator. By the remarks made earlier in this proof the speculator sells if and
only if one of the following 3 cases occurs: (i) Im = 0 and IS = 1, (ii) Im = 1 and Z = 1, (iii)
Im = 1, Z = 0 and IS = 1. In case (i) MMnU has the winning bid with probability σ(b); in
cases (ii) and (iii) MMnU has the winning bid with probability 1. With probability 1−π
2
the
34We suppose here, without loss of generality, that the speculators always trades when she is indifferent
between trading and abstaining.
35MMnU is subject to greater adverse selection than in the baseline case. As l < 12 in the baseline model,
l < 12 with observable quotes as well.
36Observe that on the equilibrium path, if IS = I1 = I2 = 0 and Z = 1 then the speculator’s expected
profit from trading the asset (either buying or selling) is at most l − 12 < 0. If instead IS = Z = 0 then
her expected profit from trading the asset is bounded above by P(trade with an uninformed MM|IS ∨ Z =
0)(l − 12 ) + P(trade with an informed MM|IS ∨ Z = 0)(u− 1) < 0.
37This must be since MMnU is indifferent between bids on the interval [0, l], and the expected profit of
bn = 0 is zero due to the remark that, in any WELM trading equilibrium, P(bn = 0 wins|V = 1) = 0.
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trader is hit by the liquidity shock and sells the asset: either Im = 1, in which case MMnU
has the winning bid with probability 1, or Im = 0, in which case MMnU has the winning
bid with probability σ(b). The second term in equation (D6) is decomposed as follows. With
probability 1
2
the asset value is V = 1, in which case a winning bid b induces a gain equal to
1− b. The probability of a sell order is the probability of a liquidity trader selling the asset,
that is, 1−π
2
. Either Im = 1, in which case MMnU has the losing bid, or Im = 0, in which case
MMnU has the winning bid with probability σ(b).









(1− p)(1− l), ∀b ∈ [l, u]. (D7)
We can now conclude the proof of the proposition. Rearranging (D6) yields (D2), from
which solving σ(l) = 1 gives us (D4). Substituting (D4) into the right-hand side of (D7) and
using the symmetry of the problem to write the resulting expression as Πn(p, q) gives us (D1).
Rearranging the terms in (D7) then yields (D3), from which solving σ(u) = 1 yields (D5). To
see that l > 0, substitute b = l into (D6). Substituting b = u into (D7) and using the fact
that l < 1
2
yields u < 1 and Πn(p, q) > 0.

Lemma D1. Assume p ∈ (0, 1) and q < 1. Let σ(·), σ(·), l and u be defined by (D2), (D3),







pσ(b) + (1− p)σ(b)
]


























pσ(b) + (1− p)σ(b)
]
(1− b) = [0, l]. (D9)
The maximum values of (D8) and (D9) are Πn(p, q), given by (D1), and 0, respectively.











(1− u), ∀b ∈ [l, u]. (D10)
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As σ(u) = σ(u) = 1, notice that the left-hand side of (D10) is strictly decreasing in b for























pσ(b) + (1− p)σ(b)
]




















for all b ∈ [0, l]. The right-hand side of the last highlighted equation is strictly increasing in b.
So combining the previous steps yields (D8). Finally, (D8) and the observation that the first
term in the maximand of (D9) is a strictly decreasing function of b together yield (D9).

Proposition D2. Assume p ∈ (0, 1) and q < 1. Let σ(·), σ(·), l and u be defined by (D2),
(D3), (D4) and (D5), respectively. Define
h(b) :=




1− σ(b) ≥ h(b), ∀b ∈ [l, u]. (C)
Then a WELM trading equilibrium exists.
Proof: The following notation will be used throughout the proof. Let the cdfs σ and σ be
defined by (D2) and (D3), respectively. Define also the cdf σ such that σ(0) = 1. Let Γ denote
the set of bid-ask price pairs (bn, an) consistent with the strategies σ, σ, and σ, that is,
Γ =
(











Similarly, let Γ+ denote the set of tuples (b1, a1, b2, a2) consistent with the strategies σ, σ, and
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(b1, a1, b2, a2) : (b1, a1) ∈ Γ, (b2, a2) ∈ Γ,
(bn, an) ∈ [l, u]× {1} ⇒ (bm, am) /∈ {0} × [1− u, 1− l],
(bn, an) ∈ {0} × [1− u, 1− l]⇒ (bm, am) /∈ [l, u]× {1}
}
.






represent the mapping from consistent tuples (b1, a1, b2, a2) to posterior
beliefs that V = 1, computed through Bayes’ rule. Let µn denote the speculator’s belief that
V = 1 based only on the quotes of MMn, with µn = ∅ in case (bn, an) /∈ Γ.38 Let µ denote the
speculator’s belief that V = 1 at the time she chooses her market order.
Assume the condition (C) holds with equality (the other case is similar). We aim to show
that the following strategies, beliefs and tie-breaking rule comprise a trading equilibrium:
(I) σ1 = σ2 = σ;
(II) σ1 = σ2 = σ;
(III) σ1 = σ2 = σ;
(IV) if IS = 1 then µ = v;
(V) if IS ∨ Z = 0 then µ = 12 ;
(VI) if IS = 0 and Z = 1 then:
µ =

β(b1, a1, b2, a2) if (b1, a1, b2, a2) ∈ Γ+;
I{1−am>bn} if µn = 1 and µm = 0;






, µn = ∅, and bn < an;
1 if µm =
1
2
, an ≤ bn, and an 6= â;
0 if µm =
1
2














38We use the terminology “speculator’s belief that V = 1” for the probability which the speculator attaches
to the event V = 1.
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(VII) ties are broken uniformly at random, except if µm =
1
2
, an ≤ bn, an = â and bn = b̂, in
which case any tie is broken in favor of MMn;
(VIII) the speculator’s market order satisfies sequential rationality with the additional require-
ment that if IS = 0, Z = 1, µm =
1
2
, an ≤ bn, an = â and bn = b̂ (in which case, by
(D12g), µ = an+bn
2
) then the speculator buys with probability 1
2




The proposed equilibrium has the following features. If the speculator acquires information
her beliefs concerning V are determined by the realized value v, that is, even if the quotes
suggest otherwise (see (IV)). If the speculator does not acquire information and quotes are
unobservable then µ is equal to the prior belief that V = 1, that is, µ = 1
2
(see (V)). The
case in which the speculator does not acquire information but gets to observe the quotes is
subdivided into 7 cases. If the quotes are consistent with the proposed equilibrium strategies,
then µ is derived using Bayes’ rule (see (D12a)). If MMn’s quotes signals V = 1 while MMm’s
quotes signals V = 0, that is, (bn, an) ∈ [l, u] × {1} and (bm, am) ∈ {0} × [1 − u, 1 − l], then
µ = 1 if 1 − am > bn and µ = 0 otherwise (see (D12b)). If MMn’s quotes are inconsistent
with the proposed equilibrium strategies but MMm’s quotes signal that MMm is informed
then the speculator ignores MMn and bases her beliefs exclusively on the quotes of MMm
(see (D12c)). The case in which MMn’s quotes are inconsistent with the proposed equilibrium
strategies and MMm’s quotes signal that MMm is uninformed are further subdivided into 4
cases. If MMn’s quotes satisfy bn < an then µ =
an+bn
2
(see (D12d)), in which case sequential
rationality precludes trading between the speculator and MMn. If an ≤ bn and MMn does not
offer the best ask price then µ = 1, (see (D12e)), in which case sequential rationality precludes
trading between the speculator and MMn.39 If an ≤ bn, MMn offers the best ask price but
not the best bid price then µ = 0, (see (D12f)), in which case sequential rationality precludes
trading between the speculator and MMn. Lastly, if an ≤ bn and MMn offers the best bid
and ask prices then µ = an+bn
2
(see (D12g)), in which case the tie-breaking rule ensures that,
conditional on placing a market order, the speculator trades with MMn (see (VII)).
Note that the proposed equilibrium satisfies the requirements of a WELM equilibrium;
thus, repeating arguments used to prove Proposition D1, on the equilibrium path, the specu-
39Observe that an 6= â implies â < 1. So, for µ = 1, the speculator’s expected profit from buying the asset
is strictly positive. On the other hand, the speculator’s expected profit from selling is at most 0. Sequential
rationality therefore requires the speculator to buy.
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lator learns the realization of V if IS ∨
(
(I1 ∨ I2) ∧ Z
)
= 1. Moreover, since l < 1
2
, sequential
rationality requires the speculator to abstain if IS ∨
(
(I1 ∨ I2) ∧ Z
)
= 0.40 It ensues that, on
the equilibrium path, MMnU’s expected profit on the bid side of the market can be written
as the left-hand side of (D6). Similarly, on the equilibrium path, MMnH’s expected profit
on the bid side of the market can be written as the left-hand side of (D7). These remarks,
Lemma D1 and the symmetry of the bid and ask sides of the market together establish that,
on the equilibrium path: MMnU’s expected profit is equal to 0, while MMnH’s expected profit
equals Πn(p, q) given by (D1). We establish in the rest of the proof that neither MMnU nor
MMnH have a profitable deviation (which, by symmetry, implies that MMnL does not have
a profitable deviation either).
Step 1: there exists no profitable deviation of MMnU to (an, bn) /∈ Γ, with bn < an.
Suppose MMnU deviates to (ãn, b̃n) /∈ Γ, with b̃n < ãn. Observe first that in this case,
applying (IV), (V), (D12c) and (D12d), the speculator trades with MMnU if and only if
IS ∨ (Im ∧ Z) = 1 (notice that if IS = Im = 0 while Z = 1 then (D12d) yields bn < µ < an).
So the “demand” facing MMnU is the same as it is on the equilibrium path. In consequence,
MMnU’s expected profit on the bid side of the market can be written like the maximand of
(D9), with b = b̃n. Yet, by virtue of Lemma D1, the maximand of (D9) is maximized when
MMnU sticks to the proposed equilibrium strategy. The symmetry between the bid and ask
sides of the market finishes to establish that (ãn, b̃n) is not a profitable deviation of MMnU.
40See the third footnote in the proof of Proposition D1.
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Step 2: there exists no profitable deviation of MMnU to (an, bn) /∈ Γ, with an ≤ bn.
Suppose MMnU deviates to (ãn, b̃n) /∈ Γ, with ãn ≤ b̃n. Now in this case, applying (IV),
(V), (D12c), (D12e), (D12f), (D12g), (VII) and (VIII) the speculator trades with MMn if and
only if either (a) IS ∨ (Im ∧ Z) = 1 or (b) IS ∨ Im = 0, Z = 1, ãn = â and b̃n = b̂. Moreover,














































































where the first two curly brackets capture case (a) in the previous paragraph, and the last
curly bracket captures case (b). Now, using Lemma D1, the term inside the first curly bracket
is at most 0. By symmetry, the same remark applies to the second curly bracket. Finally, the





, which, since ãn ≤ b̃n,
is at most 0. So (ãn, b̃n) is not a profitable deviation of MMnU.
Step 3: there exists no profitable deviation of MMnU to (an, bn) ∈ Γ.
Suppose MMnU deviates to (ãn, b̃n) ∈ Γ, say ãn = 1 and b̃n ∈ [l, u] (the other case is
analogous, by symmetry). Consider first the ask side of the market: either V = 1 or ãn 6= â
with probability 1. So the expected profit of MMnU on the ask side of the market is at most
0. Next, consider the bid side of the market. By virtue of (IV), (V), (D12a) and (D12b) the
speculator sells and trades with MMnU if and only if V = 0 and:
• either IS = 1;
• or Im ∧ Z = 1 and b̃n ≤ 1− am.
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[(1− p) + pσ(b̃n)](1− b̃n).
Conditional on MMmL, 1− am is distributed according to the cdf σ. Hence, using condition
(C), P(b̃n ≤ 1 − am|MMmL) = 1 − σ(b̃n) ≥ h(b̃n). Substituting this inequality into the last




















[(1− p) + pσ(b̃n)](1− b̃n). (D13)
















which, by definition of h(b̃n), is equal to 0. So (ãn, b̃n) is not a profitable deviation of MMnU.
Step 4: there exists no profitable deviation of MMnH to (an, bn) /∈ Γ, with bn < an.
Suppose MMnH deviates to (ãn, b̃n) /∈ Γ, with b̃n < ãn. Note to start with that MMnH’s
expected profit on the ask side of the market has to be non-positive. Consider next the bid
side of the market. Observe that by (IV), (V), (D12c) and (D12d), the speculator never sells
to MMnH. Hence, the “demand” facing MMnU is the same as it is on the equilibrium path.
In consequence, MMnH’s expected profit on the bid side of the market can be written like
the maximand of (D8), with b = b̃n. Yet, by virtue of Lemma D1, the maximand of (D8)
is maximized when MMnH sticks to the proposed equilibrium strategy. So (ãn, b̃n) is not a
profitable deviation of MMnH.
Step 5: there exists no profitable deviation of MMnH to (an, bn) /∈ Γ, with an ≤ bn.
Suppose MMnH deviates to (ãn, b̃n) /∈ Γ, with ãn ≤ b̃n. We start by showing that MMnH
cannot make positive expected profit against the speculator. First, by virtue of (IV) and
(D12c), if IS ∨ (Im ∧ Z) = 1 then the speculator never sells. Furthermore, it is impossible to
make profit against the speculator if she buys, since V = 1 and ãn ≤ 1. Hence, conditional on
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IS ∨ (Im ∧ Z) = 1, MMnH makes at most zero profit against the speculator. Next, by virtue
of (V), (D12e), (D12f) and (D12g), if IS ∨ Im = 0 then the only case in which MMnH trades
with the speculator is if Z = 1, ãn = â and b̃n = â. Furthermore, in that case, by (VIII) the
speculator buys and sells the asset with probabilities 1
2
each. Applying (VII), the expected










Yet ãn ≤ b̃n. Thus MMnH makes at most zero expected profit against the speculator. The
expected profit of MMnH is then bounded above by the expected profit made against the
liquidity trader, which we can write as 1−π
2
[
pσ(b̃n) + (1 − p)σ(b̃n)
]
(1 − b̃n) + 1−π2 P(ãn =






(1− b̃n), which by (D8) is at most equal to MMnH’s expected profit
in the proposed equilibrium. So (ãn, b̃n) is not a profitable deviation of MMnH.
Step 6: there exists no profitable deviation of MMnH to (an, bn) ∈ Γ.
There are two possible cases. MMnH could deviate to masquerade as MMnL or MMnH
could deviate to masquerade as MMnU. Suppose MMnH deviates to masquerade as MMnL.
Then bn = 0 < b̂ with probability 1. So the expected profit of MMnH on the bid side of
the market is 0. On the other hand, since V = 1, the profit of MMnH on the ask side of
the market is bounded above by 0. Since sticking to his proposed equilibrium strategy yields
MMnH an expected profit of Π(p, q) > 0, deviating to masquerade as MMnL is therefore not
a profitable deviation. Next, suppose MMnH deviates to masquerade as MMnU. Reasoning
as above, the expected profit of MMnH on the ask side of the market is bounded above by 0.
Consider now the bid side of the market, with bn = b̃n ∈ [0, l]. Since V = 1, we deduce from
(IV), (V) and (D12a) that the speculator never sells. MMnH’s expected profit on the bid side





pσ(b̃n) + (1 − p)σ(b̃n)
]
(1 − b̃n), which, applying
Lemma D1, is bounded above by MMnH’s expected profit on the bid side of the market in
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Lemma D2. Assume p ∈ (0, 1) and q < 1. Let Πn(p, q), l, u and h(·) be defined by (D1),
(D4), (D5), and (D11) respectively. Then:
(i) for all ε > 0, p > 1− 2ε
1−π implies Πn(p, q) < ε;
(ii) for all δ > 0, p > 1− δ implies l < δ and h(b) < 0 for all b ∈ [δ, u];
(iv) 1− u > 1−p
2
.












Hence, 1− p < 2ε
1−π implies Πn(p, q) < ε, giving part (i) of the lemma. Part (iii) follows from
the remark that l < 1
2
.
We now show part (ii) of the lemma. The denominator on the right-hand side of (D4) is
minimized at q = 0 and z = 0, with minimum value (2− p)(1− π) > 1− π. Hence,
l ≤ (1− π)(1− p)
1− π
= 1− p.
Pick a δ > 0. Then, p > 1 − δ implies l < δ. We next show that choosing p > 1 − δ also
















which, by Lemma D1, we can rewrite as[
π
(






b = Πn(p, q).
Solving for h(b) gives
h(b) =







2Πn(p, q)− b (1− π)
]
, ∀b ∈ [l, u]. (D14)
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Now let ε := δ(1−π)
2
. By part (i) of the lemma, p > 1− 2ε
1−π implies Πn(p, q) < ε, so, p > 1− δ




[2ε− δ (1− π)] = 0, ∀b ∈ [δ, u].

Proposition D3. There exists a function z(.) > 0, independent of q, such that a WELM





1−π . If q = 1, a WELM trading equilibrium exists for all values of p and z.
Proof: We remarked at the beginning of this appendix that if q = 1 or p = 1 (or both)
the existence of a WELM trading equilibrium then follows from the existence of a trading
equilibrium in the baseline model. That z(p) = 1 for p = 0 is easy to show. We assume in the
rest of the proof that p ∈ (0, 1) and q < 1.
Step 1: there exists z(p) > 0, independent of q, such that z ≤ z(p) implies that a WELM
trading equilibrium exists.
Define, for all b ∈ [l, u], D(b) := 1 − σ(b) − h(b), where σ(·), l, u and h(·) are defined
respectively by (D3), (D4), (D5) and (D11). Thus,
D(b) =
(1− π)(1− b)− 2Πn(p, q)
(1− π)(1− b)p
− 2Πn(p, q)− b(1− π)− 2bπq
2bpzπ(1− q)
, ∀b ∈ [l, u], (D15)
with Πn(p, q) given by (D1). By Proposition D2, it suffices for our purpose to show the
existence of z(p) > 0, independent of q, such that z ≤ z(p) implies D(b) ≥ 0 for all b ∈ [l, u].
First, straightforward algebra establishes that h(l) = 1 and σ(l) = 0. Hence,
D(l) = 0. (D16)










, ∀b ∈ [l, u]. (D17)
The bracketed expression on the right-hand side of (D17) is decreasing in b and increasing in
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q, so








, ∀b ∈ [l, u].
We showed in Lemma D2 that 1− u > 1−p
2
, so the last inequality implies








, ∀b ∈ [l, u]. (D18)
The expression inside the square bracket is independent of q, and tends to +∞ as z tends to
0. Hence, there exists z(p) > 0, independent of q, such that z ≤ z(p) implies D′(b) ≥ 0 for all
b ∈ [l, u]. Since D(l) = 0, we obtain D(b) ≥ 0 for all b ∈ [l, u] whenever z ≤ z(p).






By virtue of (D17),
























and, using (D19), D′(b) ≥ 0 for all b ≤ δ. By Lemma D2, p > 1−δ implies l < δ. So p > 1−δ
implies D′(b) ≥ 0 for all b ∈ [l, δ]. By (D16), p > 1 − δ therefore implies D(b) ≥ 0 for all
b ∈ [l, δ]. Yet, by Lemma D2, p > 1 − δ also implies h(b) < 0 for all b ∈ [δ, u]. So p > 1 − δ
implies D(b) ≥ 0 for all b ∈ [l, u].














, a WELM trading equi-
librium exists for all values of p, q and z.
Proof: Recall: if q = 1 or p ∈ {0, 1} (or both) the existence of a WELM trading equilibrium
then follows from the existence of a trading equilibrium in the baseline model. We therefore
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assume in the rest of the proof that p ∈ (0, 1) and q < 1.






1−π)2 . By Proposition D3, a WELM trading equilibrium exists





1−π . Next, let, as in the proof of Proposition D3, D(b) := 1−σ(b)−
h(b). By (D18), p < p̃ implies






















Thus, p < p̃ implies D′(b) ≥ 0 for all b ∈ [l, u]. Since D(l) = 0, we obtain D(b) ≥ 0 for all
b ∈ [l, u] whenever p < p̃. By Proposition D2, a WELM trading equilibrium therefore exists
for all p < p̃.

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